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1“The lands…belonged to them, once 
by the Indian title, twice for having 
defended them…and thrice for having 
built and lived on them”1: The Law and 
Politics of Métis Title
KAREN DRAKE* & ADAM GAUDRY**
To predict what is on the horizon of the Métis legal landscape, we can look to jurisprudence 
on First Nations’ rights, given that Métis rights cases are typically ten to fifteen years 
behind those of First Nations. With the release of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Tsilhqot’in, the next big issue in Métis law may be Métis title. Scholars have doubted the 
ability of Métis to establish Aboriginal title in Canada for two reasons: first, Métis were too 
mobile, and second, Métis were too immobile. This paper critically analyzes these positions 
and argues that the case for Métis title in Canada is a strong one. As such, governments in 
Canada would do well to focus on resolving outstanding Métis title claims.
* Karen Drake, Assistant Professor, Bora Laskin Faculty of Law, Lakehead University. We are 
grateful to Matthew Siddall for his diligent research assistance and to Jason Madden 
and the editors and anonymous reviewers of the Osgoode Hall Law Journal for their 
valuable comments.
** Adam Gaudry, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Native Studies and Department of Political 
Science, University of Alberta.
1. Louis Riel, “Last Memoir” in A-H de Trémaudan, ed, Hold High Your Heads: History of the 
Métis Nation in Western Canada, translated by Elizabeth Maguet (Winnipeg: Pemmican 
Publications, 1982) at 207-208; Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 
2016 SCC 12 at paras 4, 23, 395 DLR (4th) 381 [Daniels]. It is important to note that 
historically, the term “Indian” was used differently than it is today. It was a general term that 
encompassed all Indigenous peoples, including Métis.
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Pour savoir ce que réserve l’avenir aux Métis sur le plan juridique, nous pouvons nous 
tourner vers la jurisprudence qui se rapporte aux droits des Premières Nations, car les 
jugements touchant les Métis accusent généralement un retard de dix à quinze ans par 
rapport à ceux qui touchent les Premières Nations. Avec la sortie du jugement Tsilhqot’in 
de la Cour suprême du Canada, le prochain problème juridique important relatif aux Métis 
pourrait être de savoir qui sont les Métis. Les spécialistes doutent de la capacité des Métis 
de prouver au Canada leur statut d’Autochtones pour deux raisons contradictoires : ils sont à 
la fois trop nomades et trop sédentaires. Cet article fait une analyse critique de ces situations 
pour conclure que les Métis possèdent au Canada un solide statut juridique. De ce fait, les 
gouvernements canadiens auraient intérêt à résoudre les revendications des Métis quant à 
leur statut.
“The lands that they owned…belonged to them once by the Indian title, twice for having 
defended them with their blood, and thrice for having built and lived on them.” 2
MÉTIS RIGHTS CASES ARE TYPICALLY ten to fifteen years behind those of First 
Nations.3 To predict what is on the horizon of the Métis legal landscape, therefore, 
we can look to jurisprudence on First Nations’ rights. The release of Tsilhqot’in 
Nation v British Columbia4 in June, 2014 marked the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
first and only declaration of Aboriginal title. The next big issue in Métis law, then, 
2. Riel, ibid at 207-208.
3. For example, see R v Powley, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 SCR 207 (sets out the test for Métis 
rights pursuant to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982 c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982]; See R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 
70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow] (establishes the general framework for section 35 Aboriginal 
rights); R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507, 137 DLR (4th) 289 (establishes the test for 
assessing First Nations and Inuit rights).
4. 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in].
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may be Métis title.5 Scholars have doubted Métis’ ability to establish Aboriginal 
title in Canada for two reasons: first, they were too mobile, and second, they were 
too immobile.6 This article critically analyzes both positions and argues that the 
case for Métis title in Canada is strong.
The argument that Métis were simultaneously both too mobile and too 
immobile to satisfy the test for Aboriginal title appeals to the variability of 
Métis land use.7 At least some Métis communities combined land use patterns 
resembling those of First Nations, such as hunting, fishing and other cyclical 
activities, with those of European communities, such as dividing and holding 
lands on a permanent and individual basis by farming the land and building 
dwellings.8 The depiction of Métis as too mobile depends on the former, while 
the depiction of Métis as too immobile depends on the latter. Part I of this article 
outlines each of these positions.
Part II argues that Métis’ mobility is no impediment to satisfying the test for 
Aboriginal title, which requires the Aboriginal nation to prove three elements: 
(i) sufficient occupation of land prior to the assertion of Crown sovereignty, 
(ii) continuity of occupation (only where the claimant relies on present occupation 
as proof of pre-sovereignty occupation), and (iii) exclusive occupation at the time 
of the assertion of Crown sovereignty.9 In regard to the first requirement, Part 
II acknowledges that if “assertion of Crown sovereignty” refers to the date when 
5. Métis claimants are seeking or have sought declarations that Métis have Aboriginal title in 
Morin v Canada & Saskatchewan, QB File No 619-1994 and in Paul v Canada, 2002 FCT 
615, 219 FTR 275. Jean Teillet, Métis Law in Canada (Toronto: Pape Salter Teillet LLP, 
2010) (loose-leaf 2015 supplement), ch 3 at 8.3.
6. See John Borrows, Freedom and Indigenous Constitutionalism, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2016) at 21 [Borrows, Freedom] (arguing that “[m]obility (or a perceived lack thereof ) 
has often been used to undermine Indigenous peoples’ freedom to pursue a good life because 
of stereotypical characterizations. Indigenous peoples are denied space in contemporary 
political life if they move too frequently. Conversely, freedom can also be diminished if they 
move too little….[I]t seems as though Indigenous peoples cannot win. In many systems of 
legal thought, Indigenous peoples are characterized as being either too nomadic or too static 
to protect their most significant relationships”).
7. See Robert K Groves & Bradford W Morse, “Constituting Aboriginal Collectivities: 
Avoiding New Peoples ‘In Between’” (2004) 67 Sask L Rev 257 at 288 (noting that the 
variability of Métis land use and occupancy was so pronounced that “it is not even useful to 
employ the term ‘Métis title’”).
8. See Catherine Bell, “Métis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)” (1997-1998) 36 Alta L 
Rev 180 at 216; Larry N Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title in Canada” in Kerry Wilkins, 
ed, Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich, 2004) 151 
at 162 [Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”].
9. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 25-26, 50. See also Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 
3 SCR 1010 at paras 143, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw].
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the Crown first purported to be sovereign over a given territory, Métis would 
have difficulty establishing Aboriginal title. Britain appeared to assert sovereignty 
over Rupert’s Land as early as 1670 via the Charter it granted to the Hudson’s 
Bay Company, before the Métis Nation existed.10 However, as Part II argues, the 
Court’s decision in Tsilhqot’in provides a compelling rationale for rejecting the 
date of the Crown’s mere assertion of sovereignty as the relevant assessment date. 
Additionally, Tsilhqot’in establishes that the standard for assessing sufficiency of 
occupation is the common law standard of a general occupant, as opposed to 
an adverse possessor.11 According to this standard, Métis must establish that, 
as of the assessment date, they acted so as to communicate to third parties that 
they held the land in question for their own purposes by using it as it was capable 
of being used, given the characteristics of the land and the Métis Nation’s own 
laws.12 An analysis of the Métis buffalo hunt, which we present below, illustrates 
that plains Métis can meet this standard. Next, the continuity requirement is not 
a problem for Métis, since it applies only when the Aboriginal claimant relies on 
present occupation to prove pre-sovereignty occupation. Métis may avoid having 
to satisfy this requirement by not relying on present occupation to establish 
Aboriginal title. Finally, Métis can satisfy the exclusivity requirement by asserting 
joint title along with the First Nations with whom they were traditionally 
allied. Part II concludes by detailing the historical alliances among Métis, Cree, 
Saulteaux, and Assiniboine peoples on the plains.
Part III rejects the notion, implicit in the majority decision in Manitoba 
Metis Federation Inc v Canada (Attorney General), that Métis were too immobile 
to establish Aboriginal title.13 According to the majority, Métis in the Red River 
settlement could not satisfy the Aboriginal title test because they held discrete 
plots of land individually, not communally.14 The problem with this rationale 
is that communal landholding is not a requirement of the test for establishing 
Aboriginal title. The error in the majority’s analysis results from a conflation of 
collective rights and communal landholding. Regardless of whether Métis held 
land communally, they certainly exercised collective rights—in other words, 
jurisdiction—in the Red River region. The majority’s conflation is especially 
troubling because it results in a vicious circle. To succeed in an Aboriginal 
title claim, an Aboriginal nation must establish that it held land in a way that 
10. See Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 156.
11. See Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 38-39.
12. See ibid at paras 38, 41.
13. 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 SCR 623 [Manitoba Metis Federation].
14. Ibid at paras 56, 59.
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would be sufficient to establish title at common law,15 and yet, the majority in 
Manitoba Metis Federation concluded that Métis in the Red River did not have 
Aboriginal title precisely because they held land in a way that was too similar to 
the common law.16 A legal test that produces such a Kafkaesque paradox deserves 
to be rejected.17
The Court’s most recent Métis-focused decision is Daniels v Canada (Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development). In this case the Court held that Métis are 
“Indians” for the purpose of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, according 
to which the federal government has legislative jurisdiction over “Indians, and 
Lands reserved for the Indians.”18 In other words, Daniels stands for the proposition 
that Métis fall within federal, as opposed to provincial, jurisdiction. Although the 
federal government may not have a legal duty to exercise its legislative authority,19 
it does have “a legal duty to negotiate in good faith to resolve land claims.”20 Thus, 
the Daniels decision removes one potential impediment to a successful Métis 
title claim, namely, the “jurisdictional wasteland” that the federal and provincial 
governments created by denying legislative authority to negotiate a resolution to 
Métis’ outstanding claims. This article removes a second potential impediment 
by countering the argument that Métis are unable to establish Aboriginal title on 
the merits. Accordingly, the federal government would do well to establish a land 
claims process for resolving outstanding Métis title claims.
I. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST MÉTIS TITLE: MÉTIS WERE 
BOTH TOO MOBILE AND TOO IMMOBILE
Both Prime Minister Sir John A. Macdonald and Parliament recognized the 
“Indian title” of Métis in the Red River, the former through statements in the 
15. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 42, 50.
16. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 13 at paras 56, 59.
17. Franz Kafka, The Trial (Penguin Modern Classics), translated by Idris Parry (Harmondsworth, 
UK: Penguin, 1983).
18. Daniels v Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at paras 2, 3, 57, 
395 DLR (4th) 381 [Daniels].
19. Ibid at para 15.
20. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 17.
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House of Commons and the latter through the Manitoba Act, 1870.21 Despite 
this official recognition, a few scholars remain skeptical of the existence of 
Métis title. Foremost among them is Thomas Flanagan, a political scientist who 
served as Canada’s expert witness in Manitoba Metis Federation.22 Flanagan is 
not a lawyer, but his arguments merit close examination for two reasons. First, 
he is the most outspoken academic critic of Métis title, and second, some of 
his arguments were adopted by the trial judge and subsequently endorsed by a 
majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Manitoba Metis Federation.23 We 
therefore outline Flanagan’s arguments briefly in this Part before responding to 
them in Parts II and III.
A. MÉTIS WERE TOO MOBILE
The notion that Métis were too mobile to establish Aboriginal title rests on the 
conventional narrative of Métis as “a society perpetually in motion—hunting 
furs, transporting goods, chasing buffalo.”24 Flanagan constructs Métis as nearly 
transient wanderers who are ultimately too nomadic to possess Aboriginal 
21. Macdonald argued “half-breeds had a strong claim to the lands, in consequence of their 
extraction” and that the reserve was necessary for “settling those claims.” Sir John A. 
Macdonald, speech to Parliament, May 4, 1870 in WL Morton, Manitoba: The Birth of a 
Province (Altona, MB: DW Friesen & Sons Ltd, 1965) at 204. The prime minister further 
elaborated that “this reservation…is for the purpose of extinguishing the Indian title and all 
claims upon the lands within the limits of the province.” Macdonald, speech to Parliament, 
May 2, 1870, in ibid at 168-69.
22. See Thomas Flanagan, Métis Lands in Manitoba (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 
1991) [Flanagan, Métis Lands] for the arguments informing his expert testimony in their 
most robust form.
23. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 13 at paras 56, 59. Manitoba Metis Federation v 
Canada (Attorney General), 2007 MBQB 293, 165 ACWS (3d) 820 [Manitoba Metis 
Federation Trial Decision]. Darren O’Toole provides a careful discussion and critique of the 
trial decision’s endorsement of Flanagan’s arguments. See Darren O’Toole, “The Red River 
Jig Around the Convention of ‘Indian’ Title: The Métis and Half-Breed Dos à Dos” (2012) 69 
Man Hist 17 [O’Toole, “The Red River Jig”]; See Darren O’Toole, “Thomas Flanagan on the 
Stand: Revisiting Métis Land Claims and the Lists of Rights in Manitoba,” (2010) 41:1 Int’l 
J Can Studies 138 at 139-140 [O’Toole, “Flanagan on the Stand”]; Darren O’Toole, “Métis 
Claims to ‘Indian’ Title in Manitoba, 1860-1870” (2008) 28:2 Can J Native Stud 241 
[O’Toole, “Métis Claims”].
24. Brenda Macdougall, One of the Family: Metis Culture in Nineteenth-Century Northwestern 
Saskatchewan (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) at 93.
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title to their homeland.25 As he does not purport to provide a legal analysis, 
his arguments understandably do not engage explicitly with the specific legal 
principles informing the test for Aboriginal title.26 That being said, Flanagan’s 
concerns can be read in light of the three requirements of the Aboriginal title 
test: sufficiency, continuity, and exclusivity of occupation. Regarding the 
first requirement, sufficiency of occupation, Flanagan argues that “Métis did 
not hunt and gather food in a specific territory marked perhaps by rivers or 
mountain ranges,”27 and while they often fought with other peoples over access 
to buffalo herds, “they did not interdict specific areas to Indian tribes, as the 
Indians tried to do with respect to each other.”28 Although Flanagan does not 
explicitly address the second requirement, continuity of occupation, it is difficult 
to fathom how Métis could have occupied a specific territory continuously if 
they did not occupy specific territories at all. Regarding the third requirement, 
exclusivity of occupation, Flanagan suggests that Métis “claimed the right to go 
anywhere they chose,” and concludes that “Métis had no exclusive territory over 
which they roamed.”29
25. Thomas Flanagan, “Metis Aboriginal Rights: Some Historical and Contemporary Problems” 
in Menno Boldt, J Anthony Long, & Leroy Little Bear, eds, The Quest for Justice: Aboriginal 
Peoples and Aboriginal Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985) at 237 [Flanagan, 
“Metis Aboriginal Rights”].
26. Ibid. Flanagan does refer to the four elements of Aboriginal title articulated in Hamlet 
of Baker Lake v Minister of Indian Affairs, [1980] 1 FC 518, [1979] 3 CNLR 17, the 
second and third of which refer to sufficiency and exclusivity of occupation. However, 
he does not refer explicitly to the legal tests for sufficiency and exclusivity of occupation. 
Moreover, as he was writing before the release of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision 
in Delgamuukw, supra note 9 and Tsilhqot’in, he does not refer to the current legal tests for 
sufficiency and exclusivity of occupation.
27. Flanagan, “Metis Aboriginal Rights”, ibid at 237.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
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B. MÉTIS WERE TOO IMMOBILE
Flanagan’s argument that the Métis were too immobile to establish Aboriginal 
title rests on a civilized-savage dichotomy. As he puts it, the “Indians have been 
endowed with Aboriginal rights under British law because of their [lower] level 
of social development.”30 According to this formulation, Métis are too civilized 
to possess Aboriginal title.31 For Flanagan, “Aboriginal title evolved in British 
law to cover the situation where British sovereignty was imposed upon nomadic, 
hunting, food-gathering peoples.”32 In places where the British encountered 
agricultural populations, Flanagan argues, the colonial authorities “left the local 
structure of property rights intact.”33 In Flanagan’s interpretation, Aboriginal 
title exists only for nomadic people when their “right to roam at will over the 
land” is curtailed by the Crown to advance “agricultural civilization” on their 
former territories.34 The limitation of Aboriginal usage enabled “the introduction 
of European methods of agriculture, which would increase the productivity of 
the soil and enlarge the population.” This project of modernization and growth 
in turn justified the sovereigns’ requirement that “the natives … surrender 
their right to live off the land and to settle down in a way compatible with 
European-style agriculture.”35 This interpretation leads Flanagan to conclude 
that if Aboriginal peoples “had been as advanced as the peoples of the Indian 
sub-continent, the British would not have invented the concept of Aboriginal 
title for them.”36 Instead, the new colonial regime that declared itself sovereign 
would have recognized the pre-existing Aboriginal property rights.37
While Flanagan is silent on why Aboriginal people who practiced intensive 
agriculture did not have their property rights acknowledged, he explicitly explains 
why Métis fail to possess Aboriginal title. Many Métis families, such as those 
occupying long river lots in the Red River valley, practiced some form of agriculture 
and used “the same methods of agriculture as white pioneers.”38 As such, Métis 
failed to gain Aboriginal rights when they adopted agricultural techniques and 
30. Ibid at 239.
31. Adam Gaudry, “Fantasies of Sovereignty: Deconstructing British and Canadian Claims to 
Ownership of the Historic North-West” (2016) 3 NAIS 46.
32. Flanagan, “Metis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 237.
33. Ibid at 238.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid at 237.
36. Thomas Flanagan, “The Case against Métis Aboriginal Rights” (1983) 9:3 Can Pub Pol’y 314 
at 322 [Flanagan, “The Case against Métis Aboriginal Rights”].
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid at 321.
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crops made available through contact with European populations.39 According to 
Flanagan, in short, Métis were simultaneously too nomadic and too sedentary to 
possess Aboriginal title.
II. IN DEFENCE OF MÉTIS TITLE: REJECTING THE MOBILITY 
CRITIQUE
This Part considers the three elements of the test for Aboriginal title—sufficiency, 
continuity, and exclusivity of occupation—and demonstrates that the mobility 
of the Métis does not hinder their ability to satisfy each of these requirements.
A. SUFFICIENT OCCUPATION
The sufficiency criterion comprises two main components: first, that the 
Aboriginal nation occupied the territory in question at a certain level of intensity 
and frequency,40 and second, a date for assessing that occupation.41 The mobility 
critique asserts that Métis were too mobile to occupy territory at a sufficient level 
of intensity and frequency. Skeptics of Métis title have also doubted whether any 
Métis occupation of territory occurred prior to the relevant date for assessing 
Aboriginal title.42 This section allays each of these doubts in turn, beginning with 
the assessment date.
1. WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE ASSESSMENT DATE?
The Supreme Court of Canada has consistently identified the assertion of Crown 
sovereignty as the relevant date for assessing Aboriginal title claims.43 Debate rages 
about what this phrase means or should mean.44 Some argue that a mere claim 
to sovereignty made by the Crown establishes the relevant date.45 Others defend 
“effective control” or “effective Crown sovereignty” as the most appropriate date 
39. See e.g. John Borrows, “Frozen Rights in Canada: Constitutional Interpretation and the 
Trickster” (1997) 22 Am Indian L Rev 37 at 44.
40. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 37.
41. Ibid at paras 25-26.
42. See e.g. Flanagan, “Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 237; Dale Gibson, “Appendix 
5A: General Sources of Métis Rights” in Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples: Perspectives and Realities, vol 4 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group 
Publishing, 1996) 271 at 281 [Gibson, “Appendix 5A”].
43. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 144; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 25.
44. Thomas Isaac offers a summary and critique of this debate. See Thomas Isaac, Métis Rights 
(Saskatchewan: Native Law Centre, 2008) at 28-30 [Isaac, Métis Rights].
45. See e.g. ibid at 29-30.
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for assessing not only Métis title claims,46 but also all Aboriginal rights and title 
claims regardless of whether the claimant is Métis, Indian, or Inuit.47 While 
the labels for this latter date vary and include Slattery’s “transition date,”48 Paul 
Chartrand’s “original date,”49 and Catherine Bell’s “date of colonization,”50 each 
appears to be synonymous with effective control51—the date when Indigenous 
peoples were no longer able to exercise control over the use of their lands.52 
While their own customs persist in overt and covert ways, they are subject to 
intensified interference by European-derived institutions after this date. Effective 
control, according to these scholars, should be measured vis-à-vis the relevant 
Indigenous nation.
Thomas Isaac is chief among those who endorse a mere claim to sovereignty 
by the Crown as the relevant date for assessing Aboriginal title.53 In defense of 
this position, Isaac points to the Court’s consistent use of the word “asserted” 
46. See Bell, supra note 8 at 182. Similarly, the trial judge in Manitoba Metis Federation 
purported to use effective control instead of the assertion of Crown sovereignty as the 
relevant date, although he interpreted the grant of the Hudson Bay Company’s Charter 
in 1670 as evidence of effective control. See MMF Trial Decision, supra note 23 at paras 
573-80; See Darren O’Toole, “Case Commentary: Manitoba Métis Federation v. Canada 
and Manitoba” (2014) 3:1&2 Aboriginal Policy Studies 178 at 185 [O’Toole, “Case 
Commentary”] (for a critique of this interpretation of effective control); Darren O’Toole, 
“Blais et Powley: les doctrines des droits aborigènes des Métis sous la loupe” (2010) 41 
Ottawa L Rev 59 at 95 [O’Toole, “Sous la loupe”]. But there are critiques of the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s use of effective control as the relevant date for assessing Métis Aboriginal 
rights claims. See Andrea Horton & Christine Mohr, “R v. Powley: Dodging Van der Peet to 
Recognize Metis Rights” (2004-2005) 30 Queen’s LJ 772 at 796, 798.
47. See Groves & Morse, supra note 7 at 272-73; Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title” supra 
note 8 at 152-53, 177. One reason for rejecting differences in timing for Métis, Indian, 
or Inuit claims is the resulting unfairness. See Catherine Bell and Clayton Leonard, “A New 
Era in Métis Constitutional Rights: The Importance of Powley and Blais” (2003-2004) 41 
Alta L Rev 1049 at 1069; Horton & Mohr, supra note 46 at 772. Such unfairness could 
potentially ground an equality claim under s 15 of the Charter. See Groves & Morse, 
supra note 7 at 287.
48. Brian Slattery, “Making Sense of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (2000) 79 Can Bar Rev 
196 at 218 [Slattery, “Making Sense”]. See Paul Chartrand, “The Hard Case of Defining 
‘The Métis People’ and Their Rights: A Comment on R. v. Powley” (2001-2003) 12 Const 
F 84 at 92 [Chartrand, “The Hard Case”] (for an endorsement of this approach in the 
Métis context).
49. Paul Chartrand, “The Hard Case”, ibid at 92.
50. Bell, supra note 8 at 190.
51. Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 166.
52. See Teillet, Métis Law, supra note 5, at 29. The mere presence of the Hudson’s Bay Company 
personnel or its post did not constitute effective control. See ibid at 171-72.
53. Isaac, Métis Rights, supra note 44 at 29-30.
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as opposed to “effective” when discussing the role of Crown sovereignty in its 
Aboriginal title decisions.54 If Aboriginal title is to be assessed from the date of 
the Crown’s mere assertion of sovereignty, as Isaac contends, then the prospect 
of the Métis Nation establishing Aboriginal title is slim. King Charles II’s grant 
of a trading monopoly over Rupert’s Land to the Hudson’s Bay Company seems 
to constitute an assertion of sovereignty,55 but this grant occurred in 1670, 
while the ethnogenesis of the Métis Nation in the northwest is widely agreed to 
have occurred in the late eighteenth century.56 Métis could not have sufficiently 
occupied territory at a time when they did not yet exist.57
Isaac’s focus on the language used by the courts rather than the actual results 
of their decisions opens him to the charge that he is quibbling over semantics. 
The reasoning underlying the actual dates selected by courts is more nuanced 
than Isaac’s focus on the term “asserted” suggests. For example, Larry Chartrand’s 
analysis of British colonial law concludes that mere assertions of sovereignty, 
such as those contained within documentary claims like the 1670 Charter 
to the Hudson’s Bay Company, had to be perfected by establishing effective 
54. Ibid (quoting Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 145); Haida Nation v British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73 at paras 17, 26, [2004] 3 SCR 511 [Haida Nation]; 
R v Marshall; R v Bernard, 2005 SCC 43 at paras 48, 72, 129, 132-34, 136-38, [2005] 2 
SCR 220 [Marshall & Bernard]. Although Isaac was writing before the release of the Supreme 
Court’s Tsilhqot’in decision, that decision continues to use the term “asserted”. Tsilhqot’in, 
supra note 4 at paras 14, 22, 25, 29, 50, 57, 58, 59, 69, 75, 81, 83.
55. Thomas Flanagan discusses the assumption that the Hudson Bay Company Charter of 1670 
constitutes an assertion of Crown sovereignty. See Thomas Flanagan, “Metis Aboriginal 
Rights”, supra note 25 at 237; MMF Trial Decision, supra note 46 at para 580. But, several 
commentators offer a critique of this assumption. See Bell, supra note 8 at 212-13; Slattery, 
“Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, infra note 73 at 736 (“It is not enough to found the 
acquisition of the continent on some bit of puffery in an ancient Charter”).
56. Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 156.
57. This may be the rationale underlying Gibson’s assumption that Métis collectives did not 
develop until after the assertion of European jurisdiction. Gibson, “Appendix 5A”, supra 
note 42 at 283. For a critique of this assumption, see Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, 
supra note 8 at 156.
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occupation.58 This principle was not tested in Delgamuukw v British Columbia.59 
The trial judge in Delgamuukw adopted 1846—when Britain and the United 
States settled their disputed land claims to the west of the Rocky Mountains 
through the Oregon Treaty60—as the assessment date.61 The reasoning in R v 
Bernard provides more explicit support for Chartrand’s analysis. The trial judge in 
that case rejected the assertion that Britain acquired sovereignty over the relevant 
area of New Brunswick through the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, given Britain’s 
limited presence in the area at that time.62 Instead, the trial judge adopted 1759 
as the assessment date, when Britain established effective control in the area 
(although the trial judge measured Britain’s effective control vis-à-vis France, not 
vis-à-vis the Indigenous peoples of the area).63
Compared to Bernard, the reasoning on this issue in R v Marshall 64 is 
sparse. Again the trial judge focused on Britain’s ability to exercise effective 
control vis-à-vis France, holding that Britain acquired sovereignty over what is 
now Cape Breton either in 1758 when it captured Louisbourg from the French, 
or in 1763 when France surrendered the majority of its remaining territories in 
North America to the British via the Treaty of Paris.65 In Tsilhqot’in, the plaintiffs 
and the province were content to accept 1846, the date of the Oregon Treaty, 
as the assessment date.66 Canada argued, however, that Britain’s first assertion of 
sovereignty over the relevant territory occurred as early as 1579, when Sir Francis 
Drake claimed part of the west coast of what is now North America, or no later 
than 1792, when Captain George Vancouver asserted sovereignty on behalf of 
58. Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 165-73, especially at 171.
59. Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1991), 79 DLR (4th) 185 at para 235, [1991] 5 CNLR 
xiii (acknowledging that “[n]o specific argument was made by counsel on this question”) 
[Delgamuukw SC]. See Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 165 (explaining 
that one reason why the assessment date is not often a contentious issue for First Nations 
is because “First Nations rarely have difficulty in proving they occupied territory prior 
to a European Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, regardless of the criteria used to establish 
sovereignty. There is usually ample anthropological and historical evidence available to prove 
occupation by First Nations well before the date of sovereignty”).
60. See Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 173.
61. Delgamuukw SC, supra note 59 at para 235.
62. R v Bernard, [2000] 3 CNLR 184 at para 92, [2000] NBJ No 138 [Bernard].
63. Ibid.
64. R v Marshall, 2001 NSPC 2, 191 NSR (2d) 323 [Marshall].
65. Ibid at para 132. An analysis of the date of the assertion of sovereignty over mainland 
Nova Scotia was unnecessary as the parties agreed that 1713 was the relevant date. See 
Marshall at para 28.
66. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700 at para 587, [2008] 1 CNLR 112 
[Tsilhqot’in trial decision].
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Britain.67 Canada’s argument, like Isaac’s, was that the Court’s use of the word 
“asserted” in Delgamuukw is determinative. As such, sovereignty need not be 
effective or established as of the assessment date.68 The trial judge rejected this 
argument, stating:
I am not persuaded that private adventurers or commissioned officers of His 
Majesty’s Royal Navy, even with their best intentions, can to the degree required 
by international law, assert sovereignty over vast territories by planting a flag and 
speaking to the utter silence of the mountains and boreal forests. They are, in my 
view, just words blowing in the wind.69
The trial judge held instead that “assertion of sovereignty” refers to the date 
when the incoming nation exercises effective or de facto control.70 He rejected a 
number of proffered assessment dates, including 1792 (when Captain Vancouver 
claimed sovereignty), 1818 (when Britain entered into a treaty with the United 
States), and 1821 (when Britain enacted legislation for the territory at issue), 
because Britain did not exercise actual effective control at any of those times. The 
trial judge ultimately selected 1846 as the applicable date,71 but he seems to have 
felt bound by previous courts’ acceptance of that date72 and thus did not consider 
whether the Crown exercised effective control at that time.
The Supreme Court’s use of the word “asserted” is not determinative. 
When courts have analyzed this issue, they have sought not the earliest mere 
assertion of Crown sovereignty but the date when the Crown was in a position 
to enforce its claims to sovereignty against other European states or when other 
European states acknowledged the Crown’s sovereignty. The courts in these cases 
did not consider whether the Crown was in any position to enforce its claims 
67. Ibid at paras 590, 588.
68. Ibid at para 589.
69. Ibid at para 596.
70. Ibid at para 600.
71. Ibid at para 602. The trial judge held that “by 1846 there was a de facto British presence in 
the area” (ibid). However, a mere presence does not necessarily amount to effective control, 
which the trial judge affirmed as the applicable standard (ibid at para 600). In Powley, for 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Crown established effective control just 
prior to 1850 because that is when European laws and customs were imposed on the Métis, 
despite the fact that “Europeans were clearly present” in the area long before 1850. Powley, 
supra note 3 at para 39.
72. Ibid at para 601.
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against Indigenous peoples in the territory at the relevant times.73 The unstated 
assumption underpinning this practice seems to be that the effective control 
exercised by Indigenous peoples over a given territory is of no significance to the 
Crown’s ability to acquire sovereignty over that same territory. In other words, 
territory effectively occupied by Indigenous peoples is terra nullius74—not yet 
possessed by a socially and politically organized community75—and thus available 
for acquisition.
If this is the rationale at play, then the practice of ignoring the presence of 
Indigenous peoples when determining the date of the Crown’s acquisition of 
sovereignty rests on unstable ground. In Tsilhqot’in, a unanimous Court boldly 
proclaimed, “The doctrine of terra nullius (that no one owned the land prior 
to European assertion of sovereignty) never applied in Canada.”76 As Borrows 
puts it, “[i]f only this declaration were deeply true. Canadian law still has 
terra nullius written all over it.”77 If the Court wants to uphold its unequivocal 
pronouncement and truly reject the doctrine of terra nullius, the way forward 
is clear. It must abandon the notion that the Crown acquired underlying title 
to Indigenous land regardless of the presence of Indigenous peoples.78 The 
notion that the Crown acquired sovereignty over Indigenous territory once it 
was able to exercise effective control over Indigenous peoples, though, is also 
73. Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can Bar Rev 727 at 735 (“the 
courts apparently feel bound to defer to official territorial claims advanced by the Crown, 
without inquiring into the facts supporting them or their validity in international law”) 
[Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”].
74. Commentators have used other terms synonymously with ‘terra nullius’. See e.g. John H 
Currie, Public International Law, 2d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008) at 275 (“res nullius”); 
MF Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law: 
Being a Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion (New York: Nego 
Universities Press, 1969) at 12 (“territorium nullius”); Robert J Miller, “The Doctrine 
of Discovery” in Robert J Miller et al eds, Discovering Indigenous Lands: The Doctrine 
of Discovery in the English Colonies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) 1 at 7 
(“vacuum domicilium”).
75. See Currie, supra note 74 at 275.
76. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 69. A similar pronouncement is made in Marshall & Bernard, 
with LeBel and Fish JJ in concurring reasons holding that “[a]t the time of the assertion of 
British sovereignty, North America was not treated by the Crown as res nullius”. Marshall 
& Bernard, supra note 54 at para 132. A similar pronouncement is made in the Australian 
context. Mabo v Queensland (No 2), [1992] HCA 23 at paras 41-42,175 CLR 1.
77. John Borrows, “The Durability of Terra Nullius: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia” 
(2015) 48:3 UBC L Rev 701 at 702 [Borrows, “Durability”].
78. Ibid at 703, 723-26; John Borrows, “Aboriginal Title in Tsilhqot’in v. British Columbia 
[2014] SCC 44” (Aug 2014) 1:7 Māori L Rev, online: <maorilawreview.co.nz/2014/08/
aboriginal-title-in-tsilhqotin-v-british-columbia-2014-scc-44> [Borrows, “Aboriginal Title”].
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problematic. To the extent that principles of international law allow European 
states to acquire sovereignty by establishing effective control over territory in the 
face of competing European occupation,79 these principles are illegitimate when 
applied to Indigenous peoples.80 The legitimacy of customary international law is 
arguably grounded in the principle of consent, insofar as these rules emerge from 
nations’ consistent behaviour and practice, which can be understood as evincing 
consent to those practices and hence to the rules underlying them.81 Indigenous 
nations neither participated in nor consented to international law principles. 
As Brian Slattery recognizes, “[a]t best, an exclusive appeal to European practice 
is capable of proving the existence of a customary rule binding European states 
among themselves, not one binding other nations and peoples.”82
On this view, whatever sovereignty the Crown currently has over Aboriginal 
title lands is de facto and not de jure.83 As Brian Slattery explains, the definition of 
de facto is “illegal or illegitimate but accepted for practical purposes,” in contrast 
to de jure, which means “rightful, legitimate, just…and [in] full compliance with 
all legal requirements.”84 This view is consistent with the Court’s description, 
in two of its decisions, of Crown sovereignty over Aboriginal title lands as de 
facto. First, in Haida Nation, the Court explains that the honour of the Crown 
arises from “the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an Aboriginal people and 
de facto control of land and resources that were formerly in the control of that 
people.”85 Second, in Taku River the Court states that the purpose of section 
79. Currie explains that originally nations could acquire sovereignty by means of effective 
occupation only over territory that was res nullius or in other words, terra nullius, but 
some scholars argue that effective occupation can “ground current claims of sovereignty 
notwithstanding the status of the territory in question at the time such effective occupation 
commenced”. Currie, supra note 74 note at 275-76.
80. See Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Sovereignty and Imperial Claims” (1991) 29:4 Osgoode Hall 
LJ 681 at 696 [Slattery, “Imperial Claims”].
81. See Currie, supra note 74 at 186.
82. Slattery, “Imperial Claims”, supra note 80 at 696.
83. See Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 Sup Ct L 
Rev (2d) 433 at 437-38 (the description of Crown sovereignty as “de facto” in Haida Nation 
and Taku River means that the assertion of Crown sovereignty “will continue to be legally 
deficient until there has been a just settlement of [Aboriginal] rights through negotiated 
treaties) [Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”]. See also Felix Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties: 
Aboriginal Nations and Canada (Saskatoon: Native Law Centre, University of Saskatchewan, 
2012) at 34-35.
84. Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, ibid at 437-38, citing Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th 
ed (St Paul: West Publishing Co, 1979) at 375, 382. See also Hoehn, Reconciling 
Sovereignties, ibid at 34.
85. Haida Nation, supra note 54 at para 32.
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35(1) is “to facilitate the ultimate reconciliation of prior Aboriginal occupation 
with de facto Crown sovereignty.”86
If the Crown’s sovereignty is merely de facto, then any rationale for employing 
dates related to Crown sovereignty in the Aboriginal title test evaporates. 
As a sub-set of Aboriginal rights,87 Aboriginal title shares its underlying rationale 
with Aboriginal rights,88 namely, the common law recognition that the laws 
of Aboriginal peoples continue in the form of rights after the Crown gains 
sovereignty over a territory.89 Both Delgamuukw and Tsilhqot’in confirm this 
interpretation. According to these cases, when the Crown asserted sovereignty, 
it acquired underlying title to the land and the pre-existing rights of Aboriginal 
peoples continued as a burden on the Crown’s underlying title.90 The assessment 
date is the time of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, because this is when the 
Crown acquired underlying title and thus when Aboriginal title crystalized.91 But 
if the Crown’s sovereignty is illegitimate and exists only in practice but not in 
law, then the Crown has no legitimate underlying title to Aboriginal title land.92 
Thus the common law right of Aboriginal title does not exist, because it never 
crystallized under the common law. On this approach, identifying the relevant 
assessment date is unnecessary because proving Aboriginal title is unnecessary. 
The only legitimate laws operating on the land are the relevant Aboriginal ones.93 
Therefore, the relevant Aboriginal nation should be entitled to exercise and 
86. Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74 
at para 42, [2004] 3 SCR 550.
87. R v Adams, [1996] 3 SCR 101 at para 25, 138 DLR (4th) 657; Delgamuukw, supra 
note 9 at para 137.
88. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 73 at 737.
89. See Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 73 at 732, 738, 739; 
Slattery, “Making Sense”, supra note 48 at 198; Horton & Mohr, “Dodging Van der Peet”, 
supra note 46 at 777-78, n 15.
90. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 12, 14, 18, 69; Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 145.
91. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at 144-45.
92. See Borrows, “Aboriginal Title”, supra note 77.
93. See Hoehn, supra note 83 at 77 (explaining that “[a]n Aboriginal nation, especially one 
that has not yet entered into a treaty with the Crown, has a solid legal and constitutional 
foundation for asserting its continuing sovereignty, as well as concomitant rights to territory 
and jurisdiction. It can also claim that Crown sovereignty is not legitimate, and therefore 
remains only de facto, until a treaty reconciles the sovereignty of the Aboriginal nation with 
Canadian sovereignty”).
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enforce its laws in the absence of court recognition.94 The Crown, in contrast, 
should have the onus to take appropriate steps to legitimate the operation of 
its own laws.95 Thus, in any contest between the operation of Crown laws and 
Aboriginal laws in territory subject to an Aboriginal title claim, the analysis 
should proceed directly to the issue of extinguishment, and the onus should be 
on the Crown to demonstrate that the rights of Aboriginal peoples to implement 
and enforce their own laws have been legitimately extinguished.96
Alternatively, if the Court refuses to shift the onus in Aboriginal title cases 
onto the Crown97 and instead insists on assessing Aboriginal title claims with 
reference to Crown sovereignty, then the appropriate assessment date is the time 
when the Crown acquired de facto sovereignty, or effective control, vis-à-vis 
Indigenous nations, not the date of mere assertion of sovereignty or of effective 
control vis-à-vis other European nations. The reason for this is not that the 
Crown acquired underlying title through effective control. As discussed in Part 2 
above, de facto sovereignty is illegitimate sovereignty. Rather, if courts are going 
to force Aboriginal peoples to prove the existence and operation of their laws, 
then that proof should at the very least be conducted in the light of an event that 
94. See Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2015 BCCA 154, 370 BCAC 193, leave to 
appeal to SCC refused, [2015] SCCA No 235. The British Columbia Court of Appeal held 
that a First Nation can bring an action in nuisance against a private company, even though 
its Aboriginal rights and title claims had not been proven in court or admitted by the Crown. 
See also Uashaunnuat (Innus de Uashat et de Mani-Utenam)c Compagnie minière IOC Inc 
(Iron Ore Company of Canada), 2014 QCCS 4403, 254 ACWS (3d) 751, leave to appeal to 
Que CA refused, 2015 QCCA 2.
95. Kent McNeil, Hoehn, and Borrows present similar arguments that question placing the 
onus on Aboriginal nations in Aboriginal title cases. See Kent McNeil, “The Onus of Proof 
of Aboriginal Title” (1999) 37:4 Osgoode Hall LJ at 777-82 [McNeil, “Onus of Proof”]; 
Hoehn, Reconciling Sovereignties, supra note 86 at 114; Borrows, “Durability”, supra 
note 77 at 728-30.
96. A full analysis of the test for extinguishment of Aboriginal rights and title is beyond the 
scope of this article. Suffice it to note that if courts are truly to reject the doctrine of terra 
nullius, then extinguishment by unilateral Crown legislation would be impossible as long 
as the Crown lacks legitimate underlying title and hence legitimate jurisdiction to enact 
such legislation.
97. See McNeil, “Onus of Proof”, supra note 95 at 782 (for an acknowledgement 
of the unlikelihood of the Supreme Court shifting the onus onto the Crown in 
Aboriginal title cases).
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had some actual impact on the existence and operation of those laws.98 Thus, 
if an assessment date must be established, then a better date for both Aboriginal 
title and Aboriginal rights is the time of effective control vis-à-vis the relevant 
Indigenous peoples.99
If effective control vis-à-vis the Métis Nation is the assessment date, then 
Métis in the prairies are not precluded from establishing Aboriginal title. When 
Britain granted the Charter to the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1670, it did not 
have effective control over Rupert’s Land. Indeed, at that time few British subjects 
had even travelled that far inland. Nor did Britain have effective control of the 
prairies in 1763 when it purported to accept a surrender of territory, including 
a southern portion of the prairies, from France in the Treaty of Paris.100 While 
the Crown may have claimed sovereignty over the prairies in 1670 and again 
(partially) in 1763, Métis repeatedly and successfully challenged its effective 
control until the late nineteenth century. After 1670, the Métis undertook 
collective political action that undermined key British policies in the Métis 
homeland. At Red River, for example, Métis were successful in expelling Scottish 
settlers in 1816, dismantling the Hudson Bay Company’s economic monopoly 
in 1849, and effectively replacing the Company’s government in 1869 in order 
98. As Chartrand notes, using effective control as the assessment date would not completely 
eliminate the discrimination inherent in Aboriginal rights law, but it would ascribe “at 
least some limited legal significance to Indigenous peoples’ actual presence in the relevant 
territory”. Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 177. To be clear, we are not 
endorsing effective control as an appropriate assessment date, as it still embodies the notion 
that might is right. Our point is assessing effective control vis-à-vis the relevant nation is 
better than assessing effective control vis-à-vis European nations, and better than using the 
mere assertion of sovereignty as the assessment date, but placing the onus on the Crown in 
Aboriginal title cases is the best option.
99. This is consistent with arguments that Aboriginal rights should be assessed as of the date 
of effective control, as opposed to the point of contact, because a close reading of the 
jurisprudence establishes that the courts understand “contact” not as a moment in time 
but as a period of time that begins with the initial meeting with Europeans and ends with 
effective control. Chartrand, “Métis Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8 at 163-64; Horton & 
Mohr, supra note 46 at 799. It is also consistent with the argument that to be legitimate, the 
Crown’s assertion of sovereignty must be confirmed with effective control. Chartrand, “Métis 
Aboriginal Title”, supra note 8.
100. As discussed above, the trial judge in Marshall adopted either 1763 as the date of British 
sovereignty, on account of the Treaty of Paris, or 1758, on account of the fall of Louisbourg 
(see the text accompanying supra note 65). Similarly, the Privy Council regarded Treaty 
3 territory, which is within the Hudson’s Bay drainage basin and thus purportedly within 
the territory covered by the 1670 Charter, to have been ceded to Great Britain by France 
by means of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co v The Queen 
(Ontario), [1888] UKPC 70, at para 52, 14 App Cas 46.
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to negotiate entry into Canadian Confederation.101 This history is hardly a 
convincing display of the Crown’s effective control of the region.
Although the British Parliament purported to pass laws and exercise 
jurisdiction over the plains in the first half of the nineteenth century, R v Goodon 
held that it “is not clear that any of these laws and regulations had much impact 
on” the hunting activities of the Métis, who continued to engage in their pattern 
of buffalo hunting in the face of European laws.102 According to the court, the 
evidence established that “although attempts were made to control the customs, 
practices, and economic life of the Metis prior to 1870, these attempts were 
largely ineffective.”103 Thus, the court accepted 1870 as the date of effective 
control for the “postage stamp” province of Manitoba as it existed at that time, 
and 1880 as the date of effective control for the remainder of what is now southern 
Manitoba.104 In R v Belhumeur, the court held that effective European control 
vis-à-vis the Métis developed in the Qu’Appelle Valley and environs “from 1882 
to the early 1900s.”105 All of these dates are well after the ethnogenesis of the 
Métis Nation and thus do not preclude the existence of Métis title.
To summarize, the notion that the Crown’s mere assertion of sovereignty 
should serve as the assessment date is unpersuasive. An analysis of the case law 
shows that the phrase “assertion of sovereignty” has been understood in terms of 
the Crown’s ability to exercise effective control, albeit vis-à-vis other European 
nations. Tsilhqot’in points toward the rejection of the terra nullius doctrine and 
hence the notion that the Crown acquired underlying title to Aboriginal title 
land regardless of the presence of Indigenous peoples. On this view, given that 
the Crown lacks legitimate underlying title to the land, Aboriginal nations—
including the Métis Nation—that have Aboriginal title claims are entitled to 
exercise and enforce their laws over their land forthwith. Despite the logic of this 
position, courts may insist on subjecting Aboriginal claimants to the Aboriginal 
title test. If so, the more appropriate assessment date is the time when the Crown 
established de facto sovereignty, or in other words, effective control vis-à-vis 
the Aboriginal claimant nation. The date of effective control will differ across 
the country and depend on the history of the particular region at issue. Most 
101. See Gaudry, supra note 31. See also R v Goodon, 2008 MBPC 59 at para 69, 234 Man R 
(2d) 278 [Goodon].
102. Goodon, supra note 101 at para 69.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. R v Belhumeur, 2007 SKPC 114 at paras 167, 190, 301 Sask R 292.
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scholars agree, however, that at least some Métis communities emerged prior to 
the beginning of effective Crown control within their territory.106
2. WAS THE OCCUPATION SUFFICIENT?
Prior to the Supreme Court’s Tsilhqot’in decision, jurisprudence seemed to indicate 
that occupation by nomadic and semi-nomadic Aboriginal communities was 
insufficient to establish Aboriginal title. If this and the myth of Métis transience 
were true, then critiques such as those espoused by Flanagan, discussed above, 
would be well founded. This section argues, in contrast, that neither of these 
assumptions is true. The Métis were not aimless nomads lacking any specific 
territory.107 Moreover, Tsilhqot’in establishes that the standard for sufficiency of 
occupation is not as high as that articulated by the Court in Marshall & Bernard 
or by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in. As Kent McNeil 
demonstrates, the latter court applied a standard for sufficiency of occupation 
that is even higher than the standard for adverse possession.108 The Supreme 
Court rejected this approach, establishing that the standard for sufficiency of 
occupation for proving Aboriginal title is that of a general occupant,109 not an 
adverse possessor.110 To establish sufficiency of occupation, a general occupant 
must demonstrate an intention to hold the land for its own purposes and 
communicate this intention to third parties.111 This is precisely what the Métis 
did when they asserted that title to Rupert’s Land was shared between themselves 
and First Nations to the exclusion of the Hudson’s Bay Company and the Crown, 
and then substantiated this assertion by following their own laws in Rupert’s Land 
rather than those of the Hudson’s Bay Company, prior to effective Crown control.
Before Tsilhqot’in, when Marshall & Bernard was the Court’s last word on 
Aboriginal title, the prospects of nomadic or even semi-nomadic Aboriginal 
communities meeting the sufficient occupation test seemed slim. The Court 
adopted what has come to be known as a site-specific approach.112 In Marshall, 
106. See Larry Chartrand, “The Definition of Métis Peoples in Section 35(2) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982” (2004) 67 Sask L Rev 209 at 229-30 [Chartrand, “Definition”]; Groves & Morse, 
supra note 7 at 273-74; Chartrand, “The Hard Case”, supra note 48 at 91.
107. See Flanagan, “Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 237.
108. Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?” 91 (2012) Can Bar 
Rev 745 at 755 [McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”].
109. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 39.
110. Ibid at para 38.
111. Ibid at paras 38, 39, 41.
112. See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 
69:2 Sask L Rev 281 at 304; McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 107 at 752.
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for example, the Court rejected the Aboriginal title claim because of the lack of 
evidence demonstrating the Mi’kmaq Nation’s regular use of the exact sites where 
Mr. Marshall had cut timber.113 The majority emphasized the important role of 
the Aboriginal perspective when assessing the standard of occupation required 
to establish Aboriginal title.114 In the end, however, Chief Justice McLachlin 
(writing for the majority) held that an Aboriginal nation must demonstrate that 
its members occupied their land in a way that would be sufficient to establish title 
under the common law.115 Although the majority did not rule out the possibility 
of establishing title on the basis of hunting or fishing,116 it made the likelihood 
of such an occurrence seem remote: “Typically, seasonal hunting and fishing 
rights exercised in a particular area will translate to a hunting or fishing right, 
but not to Aboriginal title.”117 According to the majority, even if an Aboriginal 
nation returned to the same hunting or fishing site year after year since time 
immemorial, the fact that they left the area for part of each year meant that “the 
land could be traversed and used by anyone.”118 In this scenario, the majority 
held, the nation has Aboriginal hunting or fishing rights but not Aboriginal title 
over the area in question.119
The British Columbia Court of Appeal endorsed the site-specific approach 
in Tsilhqot’in.120 It held that Aboriginal title can exist only over specific tracts of 
land with defined boundaries.121 Although the Tsilhqot’in Nation limited their 
Aboriginal title claim to five per cent of their traditional territory,122 the Court 
of Appeal held that they had made a broad “territorial” claim instead of a claim 
to specific sites.123 To succeed, the Tsilhqot’in Nation needed to identify specific 
113. Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at paras 79-80.
114. Ibid at paras 45-48,50-52, 54, 60, 64, 68-69, 70, 78.
115. Ibid at paras 54, 60, 61, 66, 69, 70.
116. Ibid at para 56, 58.
117. Ibid at para 58.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid at para 58. See also para 81. The majority quoted with approval the following statement 
by the trial judge in Bernard: “Occasional forays for hunting, fishing and gathering are not 
sufficient to establish Aboriginal title in the land.” See also Borrows, Freedom, supra note 6 
at 30 (explaining the Supreme Court of Canada’s characterization of the Mi’kmaq people in 
Marshall & Bernard as being too mobile to establish sufficient occupation).
120. Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285 at para 224, 33 BCLR (5th) 
260 [Tsilhqot’in Court of Appeal]. See also McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra 
note 108 at 759.
121. Tsilhqot’in Court of Appeal, supra note 120 at para 230. See also McNeil, “Site-Specific or 
Territorial?”, supra note 108 at 753.
122. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 6.
123. Tsilhqot’in Court of Appeal, supra note 120 at para 217.
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sites within their territory and provide evidence that they occupied those sites 
intensively and regularly, for example by building and occupying permanent 
villages or by cultivating or enclosing fields.124 Activities like hunting, fishing, 
and gathering could only ground title if they occurred intensively “over a definite 
tract of land the boundaries of which are reasonably capable of definition.”125 The 
Tsilhqot’in Nation’s claim was not framed in terms of occupation of specific sites, 
so it failed.126 If this is the standard of occupation required to prove Aboriginal 
title, and if the Métis were highly nomadic, then they will have great difficulty 
establishing Aboriginal title, and Flanagan’s argument would seem to be sound.
Both premises of this argument should be rejected, however. With respect 
to the first, the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in explicitly rejected the Court of 
Appeal’s site-specific approach and granted a declaration of Aboriginal title to the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation throughout a broad territory.127 Even though the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation was semi-nomadic, meaning that some areas of their territory remained 
unoccupied for portions of each year, their occupation was still sufficient to 
establish Aboriginal title.128 Living in specific village sites and working on farms 
are not the only activities that amount to sufficient occupation.129 Rather, the 
Court emphasized that hunting, fishing, trapping, foraging, cutting grass or trees, 
and merely waking around the land130 can also establish sufficient occupation.131
In rejecting the site-specific approach, the Court explained that the standard 
of occupation required to prove adverse possession is not the correct standard 
for establishing sufficiency of occupation in an Aboriginal title claim.132 Instead, 
Aboriginal title claimants must meet the requirements for general occupancy at 
common law,133 which is a lower standard than that for adverse possession.134 
Unlike an adverse possessor, a general occupant is not trying to oust the original 
124. Ibid at paras 215-16, 221, 230.
125. Ibid at para 230.
126. Ibid at paras 126, 240, 344. The Court of Appeal held that its decision did not preclude the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation from bringing a new claim in the future for Aboriginal title formulated in 
terms of specific sites (ibid at para 241).
127. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 9, 42-43, 153.
128. Ibid at paras 55-56.
129. Ibid at para 42.
130. Ibid at para 39.
131. Ibid.
132. Ibid at para 38.
133. Ibid at para 39.
134. Tsilhqot’in, ibid at para 40; R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at para 37, 218 NSR (2d) 78, 
Cromwell JA [Marshall Court of Appeal]. Marshall Court of Appeal adopts the analysis 
of Kent McNeil.
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owner. Rather, a general occupant asserts “possession of land over which no 
one else has a present interest or with respect to which title is uncertain.”135 As 
McNeil explains, the standard applied by the British Columbia Court of Appeal 
in Tsilhqot’in was incorrect because it was even higher than that applied in adverse 
possession cases, where a wrongdoer attempts to oust the rightful owner by 
trespassing on the land for a sufficient period of time.136 But as McNeil recognizes, 
“Aboriginal peoples claiming Aboriginal title are obviously not wrongdoers—on 
the contrary, they are claiming title because they were in rightful occupation of 
their traditional lands at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty.”137 Although 
the Supreme Court does not explicitly articulate this rationale in Tsilhqot’in, 
it illustrates why the standard of a general occupant is preferable to that of an 
adverse possessor in Aboriginal title cases.138
Some may object that while this rationale might apply to Inuit and First 
Nations, the same cannot be said for the Métis Nation. Some have argued that 
Métis were not the original owners of the land because Métis did not even exist 
until after Europeans arrived.139 The issue is sometimes framed as a response to 
the term “Aboriginal.”140 Some have claimed that Métis are not “Aboriginal” 
because this term means having “original possession of the soil”141 or “from the 
beginning,”142 but Métis were not here from the beginning.143 Thus, according 
to this argument, Métis should not benefit from the lower standard for assessing 
occupation because they were not original owners of the land.
This argument is unpersuasive because it rests on a mistaken assumption 
about the appropriate assessment date for Aboriginal title, namely, the time of 
initial European contact. As discussed above, either the test for Aboriginal title 
135. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 39.
136. See McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 108 at 758.
137. Ibid at 758 [emphasis added].
138. Note that the concept of general occupancy is a common law concept which does not reflect 
the understanding of at least some Indigenous peoples regarding their relationship to land.
139. See Flanagan, “Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 236.
140. See Bell, “Métis Constitutional Rights”, supra note 8 at 192 (for a discussion of possible 
implications of the word “Aboriginal” in defining Métis rights).
141. See Flanagan, “Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 236.
142. See Gibson, “Appendix 5A”, supra note 42 at 275 (for use of the “from the 
beginning” phrase).
143. In response to this argument, Darren O’Toole argues in favour of employing the French 
translation of s 35, rather than the English, in the case of the Métis. According to 
O’Toole, the French term “autochtone” does not have the same connotation of “from time 
immemorial” as does the term “Aboriginal”. O’Toole, “Sous la loupe”, supra note 45 at 75, 
84. Chartrand makes a similar argument extolling the virtues of the French term. See Paul 
Chartrand, “The Hard Case”, supra note 48 at 91.
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should be reworked completely by placing the initial onus on the Crown instead 
of the Aboriginal nation, or if the Court declines to implement this option, then 
the more appropriate assessment date is the time of de facto Crown sovereignty, 
or in other words, effective control vis-à-vis the Aboriginal claimant nation. The 
historical evidence indicates that at least some Métis communities emerged before 
the Crown established effective control of Métis territory.144 In at least some 
instances, therefore, the Métis are the original owners of their land insofar as they 
were exercising jurisdiction and enforcing Métis laws in their territory prior to 
the Crown doing so, or in other words, prior to de facto Crown sovereignty.145
This brings us to a discussion of the standard of occupation required for 
a general occupant to establish possession of land, and then to an analysis of 
whether the Métis Nation fulfilled that standard prior to effective British control.
A general occupant must demonstrate that “it has historically acted in a 
way that would communicate to third parties that it held the land for its own 
purposes.”146 This standard is to be assessed contextually, which means at least 
two things. First, a court must consider both the common law perspective 
and the Aboriginal perspective when applying this standard.147 The Aboriginal 
perspective includes, among other things, the laws and customs of the Aboriginal 
claimant nation.148 Second, the types of acts that can satisfy the standard will 
vary, depending on the character of the land over which title is asserted and 
the character of the Aboriginal nation.149 In other words, when determining 
whether the land was used at a sufficient level of intensity and frequency, a court 
will consider the ways in which the land was capable of being used in light of 
the Aboriginal group’s “size, manner of life, material resources… technological 
abilities,” and laws.150 A contextual analysis recognizes that an Aboriginal nation 
might have a different conception of possession of land than that espoused by 
the common law,151 so the standard of occupation must “reflect the way of life of 
144. See Chartrand, “Definition”, supra note 106 at 229-30; Groves & Morse, supra note 7 at 
273-74; Chartrand, “The Hard Case”, supra note 48 at 91.
145. There is a discussion of various instances of Métis law implemented by the Métis Nation 
prior to effective Crown control. See John Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010) at 86-91; Karen Drake, “R. v. Hirsekorn: Are 
Métis Rights a Constitutional Myth?” (2013) 92:1 Can Bar Rev 149 at 167-69.
146. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 38.
147. Ibid at para 34.
148. Ibid at paras 35, 41.
149. Ibid at paras 37, 38.
150. Tsilhqot’in, ibid at para 35. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 73 at 758.
151. Tsilhqot’in, ibid at para 41.
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the Aboriginal people, including those who were nomadic or semi-nomadic.”152 
According to this approach, activities like fishing, hunting, and gathering should 
be given more weight in the context of a large expanse of uncultivated territory 
than in the context of enclosed, cultivated land.153 The question, then, is whether 
the Métis Nation communicated to third parties that it intended to hold land 
for itself by using the land in the way it was capable of being used, given the 
characteristics of the land and the Métis Nation’s own laws and customs.
To answer this question, it is first necessary to recognize that the myth of 
Métis transience is just that, a myth. Brenda Macdougall’s meticulous review of 
archival records154 demonstrates that the Métis in northwestern Saskatchewan 
were not aimless nomads, untethered to any particular territory. The Métis of 
that region travelled within a “well-defined and regionally bounded geography” 
which they identified as their homeland.155 In contrast to Flanagan’s suggestion 
that Métis lacked distinct territory, Macdougall and Nicole St-Onge demonstrate 
that Métis hunting brigades traversed significant territories and had common 
destinations and points of origin. Red River, Whitehorse Plains, the Cypress Hills, 
Wood Mountain, St Laurent, and Round Prairie are all common reference points 
for nineteenth century Métis families, serving as important wintering sites and 
staging points for Métis hunts.156 Likewise, the court in Goodon held that Métis of 
southern Manitoba followed a seasonal pattern, returning to the same summering 
and wintering sites each year.157 This particular Métis community’s territory was 
vast, but not undefined; it included “all of the area within the present boundaries 
of southern Manitoba from the present day City of Winnipeg and extending south 
to the United States and northwest to the Province of Saskatchewan including 
152. Ibid at para 38.
153. Ibid at para 40; Marshall Court of Appeal, supra note 134 at para 137.
154. See Macdougall, One of the Family, supra note 24 at xvi, 1 (providing an account of the 
author’s methodology).
155. Macdougall, ibid at 126.
156. Brenda Macdougall & Nicole St-Onge, “Rooted in Mobility: Métis Buffalo-Hunting 
Brigades” (2013) 71 Manitoba History 16 at 22, 25. See also Louis Goulet, as told to 
Guillaume Charette, Vanishing Spaces: Memoirs of a Prairie Métis, translated by Ray 
Ellenwood (Winnipeg: Editions Bois-Brûlés, 1976) 43, 60-62; George Woodcock, Gabriel 
Dumont: The Métis Chief and his Lost World (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 1975) at 192-93; 
Borrows, Freedom, supra note 6 at 21 (explaining that “Indigenous peoples are not rootless. 
Our travels usually occur in relationship to territories with which we have long-standing 
associations…. Ancient homelands remain a pivotal axis around which most Indigenous 
peoples’ lives revolve”).
157. Goodon, supra note 101 at paras 35-36.
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the area of present day Russell, Manitoba.”158 Characterizing Métis occupation of 
territory as cyclical is a more accurate representation of Métis life than Flanagan’s 
description of Métis as wandering nomads without a clear sense of territory.159 
Métis who were engaged in this cyclical movement between wintering sites, 
gathering points for the hunt, trading posts, and Red River seem to understand 
their relationship to territory in this manner. Louis Goulet, a nineteenth century 
Métis hunter, describes this movement between regular sites of occupation:
As soon as the snow melted in spring, we would leave our winter camp as we always 
did and head for another location, either farther south or farther north, around Fort 
Layusse (Edmonton), or St. Albert and beyond [and then] we’d return to the Red 
River…160
The occupation of Métis territory may not have been permanent, but it 
was regularized and predictable by place and season, as evidenced by the Métis 
communities who still live in these places.
Much of this movement was for hunting buffalo. The Métis buffalo hunt 
satisfies a contextual application of the standard for sufficient occupation within 
the Aboriginal title test, insofar as Métis used the land in the way it was suitable 
for being used and in accordance with their own laws. It was also an effective use of 
the land, because it was a more assured occupation than farming throughout most 
of the nineteenth century.161 The Red River Settlement experienced numerous 
agricultural failures. The Red often flooded162 and as late as 1868, Red River 
experienced a grasshopper infestation that consumed most of the settlement’s 
crops.163 Even in an era of declining buffalo, the buffalo hunt was a more secure 
living than agricultural settlement, and to insist upon a completely sedentary 
existence would have meant the ill health or even death of many families. From 
the standpoint of Métis hunting families, this ongoing use of territory through 
movement perpetuated their title to the Northwest Territories.
The great buffalo hunts of the nineteenth century formed the basis of 
Métis governance. These were the means by which Métis vested their territorial 
control. The establishment of buffalo hunt governance utilized a long-standing 
158. Ibid at para 48.
159. Macdougall & St-Onge, supra note 156 at 26.
160. Charette, supra note 156 at 53.
161. See Gerhard J Ens, Homeland to Hinterland: The Changing Worlds of the Red River Métis in the 
Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996) at 139.
162. Alexander Ross, The Red River Settlement: its rise, progress, and present state, with some account 
of the native races and its general history to the present day (Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers, 
1972) at 107, 114.
163. Charette, supra note 156 at 53.
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and agreed-upon system to assert political authority over Métis and others who 
hunted within a given territory. Goulet’s memoirs describe large assemblies of 
Métis families and other Indigenous people gathering at predetermined times “to 
elect the first and second leader along with a council of at least twelve” as well as 
setting the “rules of order for the march.”164 Métis hunter Peter Erasmus described 
the goal of the hunt as ensuring the “well-being of the majority,” putting in place a 
customary law of “communal sharing” among families engaged in the hunt.165 In 
his memoir, Louis Riel connected buffalo hunt governance with Métis ownership 
of territory. By inverting the claims of Company rule in Rupert’s Land, Riel 
argued that Métis law effectively governed many of the fur trade communities 
throughout the region, that “the Hudson’s Bay Company was surrounded by 
Métis government all through the fertile zone,” and that Company men in “the 
camps, in the ‘wintering over’ quarters, [and] in the Métis settlements, hunted, 
traded and carried on business … under the protection of Métis laws.”166
Métis governed themselves and access to their shared territory through the 
buffalo hunt, a complex socio-political and economic formation that possessed 
constitutional qualities for the Métis. A formal election by an assembly of families 
occurred at the start of every hunt to appoint a leader. This process of forming 
an assembly and conducting an election was treated as a constitutional process 
that asserted Métis law and territorial access on the prairies. After the selection 
of the hunt’s leadership, the final responsibility of the assembly of families was 
the codification of the Law of the Hunt, a body of basic rules that all party 
members were obliged to follow. By the 1840s, general rules appear to be more 
or less common in all the hunts. Despite such recurrence, the rules still required 
ratification by the assembled families to have legal authority. These rules, recorded 
by Alexander Ross in 1840, can be generalized to other hunts:
1. No buffalo to be run on the Sabbath-day.
2. No party to fork off, lag behind, or go before, without permission.
3. No person or party to run buffalo before the general order.
4. Every captain, with his men, in turn, to patrol the camp and keep guard.
164. Ibid at 17-19.
165. Peter Erasmus, Buffalo Days and Nights (Calgary: Glenbow-Alberta Institute, 1976) at 229.
166. Riel, supra note 1 at 204. See also Signa AK Daum Shanks, Searching for Sakitawak: Place 
and People in Northern Saskatchewan’s Île-à-la-Crosse (PhD Dissertation, University of 
Western Ontario, 2015) [unpublished] at 99-151, 127-28, 140, 147-48, 150 (documenting 
the ways in which Métis laws and legal norms consistently governed Île-à-la-Crosse in the 
nineteenth century, despite various attempts by the Hudson’s Bay Company to implement 
and enforce British law).
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5. For the first trespass against these laws, the offender to have his saddle and bridle 
cut up.
6. For the second offence, the coat to be taken off the offender’s back, and be cut up.
7. For the third offence, the offender to be flogged.
8. Any person convicted of theft, even to the value of a sinew, to be brought to the 
middle of camp, and the crier to call out his or her name three times, adding the 
word ‘Thief,’ at each time.167
These rules represent a fairly regularized approach to the hunt government. 
Each of the eight rules targeted behaviours that were most likely to create 
dissension in a Métis camp, such as hunting the buffalo ahead of the camp.168 No 
hunter could go ahead of the main party or break off from it without permission 
of the council. This rule prevented opportunistic hunting by enterprising 
individuals whose early runs at buffalo scared the herds away from the main 
camp. These “laws of the hunt” reinforced the well-known rule that the hunt 
would engage in “communal sharing regardless of the number of animals killed 
by any one man,” so that every cart on the trip received enough meat to support 
its family.169 To further ensure the communal benefit of the hunt, the hunt chief 
was also responsible for making “at least one free run through the herd, dedicating 
the beasts he then slaughtered to the old and the sick who could not hunt for 
themselves.”170 The constitutional basis of the entire political assembly, then, 
was one of equity among families, recognition of familial independence, and 
equal interest of all in the success of the hunt. The entire hunt revolved around 
these basic principles. Only after the “semi-religious ceremony” of electing the 
hunt’s leadership would the Council’s decisions be considered “law, entirely and 
everywhere, for the duration of the journey.”171
By implementing and following their own laws rather than those of the 
Hudson’s Bay Company throughout their territory, Métis demonstrated an 
intention to hold the land, with First Nations, for their own purposes. Through 
the hunt, Métis asserted their political authority and territoriality in the places 
they inhabited throughout the year. It was through this ongoing use that they 
established and maintained their occupation of territory. They also understood 
that their claim to territory—their Aboriginal title—was both a prior and superior 
167. Ross, supra note 162 at 249-50.
168. Woodcock, supra note 156 at 98.
169. Erasmus, supra note 165 at 229.
170. Woodcock, supra note 156 at 76.
171. Charette, supra note 156 at 21.
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claim to the Crown’s. When Canada attempted to undercut Métis control of 
territory, Riel responded:
What did the Government do? It laid its hands on the land of the Métis as if it were 
its own. By this one act it showed its plan to defraud them of their future…not only 
did it take the land from under their feet, it even took away their right to use it.172
Even after 1870, Métis continued to assert both their title and their rights. 
In the winter of 1880-1881, the new Canadian authorities prevented Métis 
living under the leadership of Gabriel Dumont from cutting wood for heat and 
building materials. In his memoirs, Dumont notes that Métis resented this: 
“[We] left Manitoba…because we were not free. And now they want to bother 
us again, to make us pay for cutting firewood.”173 Métis in Saskatchewan felt 
entitled to cut firewood: the right to do so stemmed from their ownership of 
the country. Dumont’s sentiment is particularly telling here in the sense that 
he felt they remained free in Saskatchewan, unlike many Métis in Manitoba 
who lived under Canadian authority, and that the Lieutenant-Governor of the 
Northwest Territories was testing Métis and their ability to continue to use their 
lands. Dumont’s demand that the Métis be allowed to continue cutting wood 
unimpeded can be viewed not just as the exercise of an Aboriginal right, but rather 
as Riel states, the perpetuation of “Métis law” governing Métis lands. In this case, 
Dumont’s people continued to govern their land into the 1880s. Their laws and 
ownership sustained an inherent right to harvest the lands and resources, a right 
that was not granted to them by the newly arrived Canadian authorities.
Despite Métis mobility and some limited Canadian presence, Métis 
leaders still asserted ownership over their lands. Since prairie life necessitated 
movement, Métis did not see their cyclical travels as undermining the ownership 
of their territory. Upon the arrival of Canadian authority in their country, Métis 
continued to assert title to their land—a title they endeavoured to keep intact 
even if Canadian authorities desired otherwise.
B. CONTINUOUS OCCUPATION
If the aboriginal title claimant relies on present occupation as proof of 
pre-sovereignty occupation, then it must also demonstrate continuity between 
present and pre-sovereignty occupation.174 Isaac doubts that the Métis Nation 
172. Riel, supra note 1 at 205.
173. Gabriel Dumont, Gabriel Dumont: Memoirs: The Memoirs as Dictated by Gabriel Dumont, 
edited by Denis Combet, translated by Lise Gaboury-Diallo (Saint-Boniface: Les Editions 
Du Ble, 2006) at 47.
174. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 45; Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 152.
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could satisfy this requirement.175 He notes that after the Northwest Resistance, 
many members of the Métis Nation went “underground” in order to avoid public 
persecution.176 Isaac speculates that the Métis underreported their presence, and 
as a result, documentary evidence of Métis occupation from pre-sovereignty until 
the present is likely lacking.177
Overcoming this perceived obstacle is a rather simple matter. To avoid having 
to prove continuity from the time before British sovereignty, an Aboriginal 
claimant must simply avoid relying on present occupation as evidence of 
pre-sovereignty occupation. The continuity requirement applies only when 
the Aboriginal claimant relies on present occupation to prove pre-sovereignty 
occupation. This is clear from Delgamuukw, in which Chief Justice Lamer 
explains that using present occupation to establish pre-sovereignty occupation 
is an alternative option for Aboriginal claimants who might otherwise find it 
difficult to muster evidence dating back to the time of pre-sovereignty.178 Present 
occupation can be a persuasive indication of pre-sovereignty occupation, but 
only if that occupation was substantially continuous.179 Thus, for those who have 
sufficient evidence of pre-sovereignty occupation without relying on present 
occupation, there is no requirement to prove continuous occupation.180
The majority’s reasons in Delgamuukw point towards a persuasive rationale 
for not imposing continuity as a stand-alone requirement. As Chief Justice 
Lamer notes, any lack of continuity may be the result of “the unwillingness of 
European colonizers to recognize Aboriginal title.”181 Imposing continuity as a 
stand-alone requirement could result in an implicit extinguishment of Aboriginal 
title in such cases. As Slattery explains, the Supreme Court of Canada in Guerin 
affirmed that Aboriginal rights, including Aboriginal title, are legal rights. Thus, 
as Justice Hall observed in Calder, they can only be extinguished by competent 
175. Isaac, Métis Rights, supra note 44 at 30-31; Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Law: Commentary and 
Analysis (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Limited, 2012) at 401-402 [Isaac, Aboriginal Law].
176. Isaac, Métis Rights, supra note 44 at 31; Isaac, Aboriginal Law, supra note 179 at 402.
177. Isaac, Métis Rights, supra note 44 at 30-31; Isaac, Aboriginal Law, ibid.
178. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 152.
179. Delgamuukw, ibid at para 152.
180. See Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights” in Kerry Wilkins, ed, Advancing 
Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd, 2004) 127 
at 135 [McNeil, “Continuity”].
181. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 153.
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legislation, not by mere executive acts.182 Imposing continuity as a stand-alone 
requirement would contradict this fundamental principle by sanctioning the 
implicit extinguishment of Aboriginal title by those executive acts that prevented 
Aboriginal peoples from engaging in continuous occupation of their territories.183 
Likewise, numerous decisions establish that the onus of proving extinguishment is 
on the party alleging extinguishment, which is normally the Crown.184 Imposing 
continuity as a stand-alone requirement would reverse the onus, insofar as 
Aboriginal claimants would then “be required in effect to prove that their title 
had not been extinguished or otherwise lost.”185
One may be forgiven for mistakenly believing that continuity is a 
stand-alone requirement, given the majority’s reasoning in Marshall & Bernard. 
There, Chief Justice McLachlin describes the test for continuity without 
acknowledging that continuity is only required when the Aboriginal nation 
relies on present occupation to prove pre-sovereignty occupation.186 This slip is 
of little consequence, though, given that the analysis of occupation in Marshall 
& Bernard did not turn on whether that occupation was continuous.187 Likewise, 
the Court in Marshall & Bernard did not reject Justice Cromwell’s conclusion on 
behalf of a majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal that continuity is not a 
182. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 73 at 749; Calder v British Columbia 
(Attorney-General), [1973] SCR 313 at para 150, 34 DLR (3d) 145, Hall J [Calder]. Hall J 
explains that because Aboriginal title is a legal right, “it could not…be extinguished except 
by surrender to the Crown or by competent legislative authority, and then only by specific 
legislation”) [Calder]; Guerin v R, [1984] 2 SCR 335 at para 80-83, 13 DLR (4th) 321, 
Dickson J. See also Sparrow, supra note 3 at para 37 (citing with approval Hall J’s analysis 
of extinguishment in Calder); Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 12 (affirming the majority’s 
holding in Guerin that Aboriginal title is a legal right).
183. McNeil, “Continuity”, supra note 180 at 137 (explaining that insofar as Aboriginal title is a 
property right, it should be subject to the common law principle that land cannot “be lost by 
[a] wrongful taking…, whether by private individuals or by the Crown”).
184. See Sparrow, supra note 3 at 1099; R v Badger, [1996] 1 SCR 771 at para 41, 133 DLR 
(4th) 324; R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723 at paras 31-38, 137 DLR (4th) 648; R v Côté, 
[1996] 3 SCR 139 at para 75, 138 DLR (4th) 385. See also McNeil, “Continuity”, supra 
note 180 at 137.
185. McNeil, “Continuity”, supra note 179 at 137. Similarly, a stand-alone continuity 
requirement would allow for loss of Aboriginal title due to abandonment by the Aboriginal 
claimants, but McNeil argues that it is doubtful whether Aboriginal title could be lost 
through abandonment. See McNeil, “Continuity”, ibid at 137-38.
186. Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at para 67.
187. Rather, the Aboriginal title analysis in Marshall & Bernard turned on the findings of lack of 
sufficiency and exclusivity of occupation. Ibid at paras 79-83.
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stand-alone requirement.188 More importantly, a unanimous Court in Tsilhqot’in 
reaffirmed the conditional nature of the continuity requirement. All references 
to the continuity requirement in Tsilhqot’in are qualified by the condition that 
it applies “where present occupation is relied on.”189 The Court never describes 
it as a stand-alone requirement.190 Moreover, the Court does not disagree with 
the trial judge’s assessment that continuity is not a stand-alone requirement. 
Rather, continuity is only relevant when “an Aboriginal claimant relies on present 
occupation to raise an inference of pre-sovereignty occupation.”191 The application 
of the continuity requirement in Tsilhqot’in confirms this interpretation: the issue 
of continuity was raised in Tsilhqot’in precisely because the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
relied on present occupation to establish their claim.192
The Métis Nation can avoid the potential problems identified by Isaac by not 
appealing to present occupation in order to establish pre-sovereignty occupation. 
This will not be overly onerous for the Métis. Given the history of European 
displacement of Métis communities,193 at least some of the Métis Nation’s claims 
will be to land that the Métis Nation does not presently occupy.
C. EXCLUSIVE OCCUPATION
The third and final requirement in the test for Aboriginal title is exclusive 
occupation. Isaac doubts the Métis Nation’s ability to meet this requirement, due 
to the presence of First Nation communities and European populations in the 
claimed territory at the time of Crown sovereignty.194 Similarly, Flanagan boldly 
asserts, “The Metis had no exclusive territory over which they roamed.”195
The mere fact of concurrent occupation of the same territory by multiple 
Aboriginal nations does not, however, preclude the possibility of Aboriginal title. 
On the contrary, such a scenario raises the issue of joint title. A majority of 
the Court in Delgamuukw recognized that the exclusivity requirement does not 
188. R v Marshall, 2003 NSCA 105 at para 160, 181, 218 NSR (2d) 78, rev’d on other grounds 
Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54.
189. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 25, 30, 45.
190. Ibid.
191. Ibid at paras 547-48.
192. Ibid.
193. See e.g. Victoria Zeilig, Ste. Madeleine: Community Without a Town: Metis Elders in Interview 
(Winnipeg: Pemmican Publications, 1987).
194. Isaac, Aboriginal Law, supra note 175 at 403; Isaac, Métis Rights, supra note 44 at 32.
195. Flanagan, “Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 25 at 237.
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necessarily mean unqualified exclusivity, given that “joint title could arise from 
shared exclusivity.”196 The majority explains:
Exclusive possession is the right to exclude others. Shared exclusive possession is the 
right to exclude others except those with whom possession is shared. There clearly 
may be cases in which two Aboriginal nations lived on a particular piece of land and 
recognized each other’s entitlement to that land but nobody else’s.197
In Marshall & Bernard, Chief Justice McLachlin (writing for the majority) 
cites this paragraph from Delgamuukw and acknowledges the possibility of 
shared title to one and the same parcel of land.198 Unfortunately, the Court 
provides no further guidance on the concept of joint title,199 other than to note 
that it “has been recognized by American courts” and “is well-known to the 
common law.”200 Kent McNeil picks up where the Court leaves off and examines 
the American and common law jurisprudence to develop a potential analysis of 
joint Aboriginal title.201 McNeil concludes that common law principles on joint 
title (specifically those pertaining to joint tenancies and tenancies in common) 
will be of limited relevance, given the sui generis nature of Aboriginal title.202 
Instead, McNeil anticipates that the test that will govern is the one the Court has 
already established for assessing exclusive occupation.203 Namely, joint Aboriginal 
claimants must establish that together they had “the intention and capacity to 
retain exclusive control” over the claimed territory.204 According to McNeil, the 
nuance added by the American jurisprudence is that joint claimants “must have 
had an amicable relationship” and that this relationship must have existed for 
196. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 158.
197. Ibid.
198. Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at para 57.
199. In Delgamuukw, the majority acknowledged that some Carrier-Sekani and Nishga peoples 
had territorial claims that overlapped with those of the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en plaintiffs, 
but did not analyze those claims, presumably because it ordered a new trial. Delgamuukw, 
supra note 9 at paras 6, 9. Overlapping claims were not at issue on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Canada in Tsilhqot’in. Tsilhqot’in supra note 4 at para 6.
200. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 158.
201. Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and Joint Aboriginal Title” (2015) 48 UBC L Rev 821 
[McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”].
202. Ibid at 869.
203. Ibid at 857.
204. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 47-48; Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at para 57; 
Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 156 (quoting Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) at 204).
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“a long time.”205 McNeil explains that when two Aboriginal groups contest one 
another’s occupation,
for Aboriginal title to exist, a court would either have to find that one group was 
in exclusive occupation and members of the other group were trespassers, or divide 
the land between the two groups by drawing a boundary between their respective 
territories. If neither of these options for unshared Aboriginal title was available on 
the facts, neither group would have title.206
The notion of joint title seems well suited to the Métis Nation. As Jean Teillet 
observes, Métis history is for the most part “a story of sharing, not exclusion.”207 
Whether the Métis together with one or more First Nations can jointly establish 
the requisite intention and capacity to retain exclusive control over any part of 
the plains will depend on the available evidence about the specific territory at 
issue. Current historical scholarship indicates that at least some Métis can satisfy 
McNeil’s amicability requirement. The Métis on the plains, for example, entered 
into alliances with First Nations through peace treaties, trade arrangements, and 
intermarriages208 that allowed Métis to occupy land jointly with First Nations 
throughout the nineteenth century. A good argument can be made that this 
satisfies the requirement that the amicable relationship between joint claimants 
must have existed for a long time.
Plains Cree scholar Robert Alexander Innes reveals that diplomatic relations 
between the Métis, Cree, Saulteaux, and Assiniboine of the nineteenth century 
northwest show signs of a close-knit alliance system.209 Of particular importance 
is the general lack of historical evidence of conflicts between these peoples.210 
Indeed, the historical record contains clear examples of these four nations 
together fighting other nations—particularly their shared traditional rivals the 
Dakota and the Blackfoot—over rather small matters like stolen horses. There is 
no evidence, however, to suggest that the Métis, Cree, Saulteaux, or Assiniboine 
205. McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”, supra note 201 at 853, 854, 855.
206. Ibid at 853-54.
207. Teillet, supra note 5, ch 3 at 3.6.
208. See Groves & Morse, supra note 7 at 288.
209. Robert Alexander Innes, “Multicultural Bands on the Northern Plains and the Notion of 
Tribal Histories” in Jarvis Brownile & Valerie Korinek, eds, Finding a Way to the Heart: 
Feminist Writings on Aboriginal and Women’s History in Canada (Winnipeg: University of 
Manitoba Press, 2012).
210. Ibid at 132-33.
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fought one another in battle.211 The conflicts that arose between these four 
peoples seem to have been settled through a normalized process of diplomacy 
rather than warfare. They were able to live together on relatively peaceful 
terms in an otherwise competitive region.212 Enduring diplomacy and alliance 
were possible because the four distinct cultures contained enough “common 
points” that these communities were able to build “social, political, military, 
and economic alliances.”213 The result was a complex network of families that 
bound these four peoples to one another. In fact, these four peoples became 
so diplomatically intertwined and closely allied that throughout the nineteenth 
century, they regularly lived together in intercultural bands and communities. 
Métis lived with Cree, Saulteaux, and Assiniboine in nominally “Indian” bands; 
Métis joined Cree buffalo hunts and trading parties; and Métis welcomed their 
“Indian” kin into their families through marriage and into their political culture 
as members of the great Métis buffalo hunts.214
As Innes’s work demonstrates, the northern plains were characterized by 
a complicated, multicultural political system, which makes the imposition of 
a one people, one territory scheme inappropriate. Scholarship has only started 
to embrace what Neal McLeod refers to as the “ambiguous genealogies” of the 
northern plains. Like Innes, McLeod argues that Indigenous families living on 
the prairies were much more multicultural than indicated by standard historical 
depictions, meaning that the plains political organization was based more on 
kinship than a sense of belonging to a nation.215 Nicole St-Onge also notes 
that while “nationalist and other ethnic ideologies hold that social and cultural 
boundaries are unambiguous and clear-cut” in their everyday usage, “identities 
are negotiable and situational and the actual lived context of the Métis Nation 
contained anomalies, fuzzy boundaries and ambiguous criteria of belonging.”216 
Where the nation began and ended was not always well defined; some level of 
overlap with other Indigenous peoples was prevalent. Nonetheless, the peoples 
211. Dumont, supra note 173 at 36; WL Morton, “The Battle at Grand Coteau: July 13 and 
14, 1851,” (1959-60), MHS Transactions, online: <www.mhs.mb.ca/docs/transactions/3/
grandcoteau.shmtl>.
212. Innes, supra note 209 at 127.
213. Ibid at 133.
214. Ibid.
215. Neal McLeod, “Plains Cree Identity: Borderlands, Ambiguous Genealogies and Narrative 
Irony” (2000) 20 Can J Native Stud 437.
216. Nicole St-Onge, “Uncertain Margins: Metis and Saulteaux Identities in St-Paul Des 
Saulteaux, Red River 1821-1870” (2006) 53 Manitoba History 2 at 2.
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of the prairies possessed a clear understanding of kinship and relatedness that 
transcended “national” belonging.
Many of the men who are remembered as the great Plains Cree and 
Saulteaux leaders had at least one Métis parent, an unproblematic reality in those 
days. Innes notes:
Chief Poundmaker’s mother is reputed to have been Métis. …Chief Little Bone or 
Michel Cardinal, was of Saulteaux/Métis ancestry, and had many wives who were 
either Saulteaux or Métis, or both. Chief Gabriel Cote, or the Pigeon, was the son 
of a Saulteaux mother and Métis man. …Chief Cowessess may have been Marcel 
Desjarlais, who was of Saulteaux and Métis ancestry.217
The noticeable existence of Métis parentage among the Cree political 
elite attests to the level of integration achieved in the nineteenth century. This 
integration emerged out of more localized intermarriage practices. Given that 
Métis lived in close proximity to their First Nation allies, marriages between 
Métis and First Nations families were common. Indeed, they were seen as 
beneficial alliance-building practices between families. St-Onge notes extensive 
inter-generational marriage alliances in mid-nineteenth century Red River, 
between Métis and Saulteaux families in the St-Paul des Saulteaux mission.218 
Such relationships were motivated by a socio-economic incentive that not only 
extended family use rights to Métis families for the abundant Saulteaux fisheries 
in the Interlake region, but also brought many Saulteaux families from St-Paul 
into the great bison hunts.219 As a result of these marriage networks, Métis and 
Saulteaux could each enhance their economic prospects through increased access 
to land. In fact, one of the benefits of intermarriage was access to the resources of 
both families, increasing the families’ economic prospects and ensuring a greater 
sharing of resources between extended family networks. Thus, relationships 
between Métis and at least some First Nations were not only amicable; they also 
functioned as a means of sharing land.
McNeil identifies an additional potential issue with respect to joint title 
claims: Even if the relationship between joint Aboriginal claimants is amicable, 
courts may still inquire “whether one group had exclusive occupation and 
members of the other group entered with permission, in which case the former 
group would have title and the members of the latter group would be guests.”220 
In other words, courts may consider whether Métis merely used land at the 
217. Innes, supra note 209 at 133.
218. Supra note 216 at 6-7.
219. Ibid at 8-9.
220. McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”, supra note 201 at 856.
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discretion of First Nations. At least some treaty negotiations indicate that Métis 
were considered to have their own rights in shared land, equal to those of First 
Nations. For example, allied Métis and Cree bands in the Saskatchewan District 
sought Métis inclusion in Treaty 6 via a treaty adhesion. At Fort Walsh in 1881, 
when Canadian government agents refused to distribute treaty annuities to Treaty 
6 bands that had left their reserves to hunt buffalo in southern Saskatchewan, 
other Treaty 6 bands began to refuse their annuities.221 In solidarity with their 
Cree relations, the local Assiniboine bands refused their treaty annuities until 
the Cree received their annuities as well.222 As the standoff intensified, two Treaty 
6 chiefs, Lucky Man and Little Pine, refused their own bands’ annuities and 
told the Canadian officials that they were to pay “every native of this country,” 
pointing to Métis in the vicinity and thereby indicating that the Métis were to be 
taken into the treaty.223 Expansion of the treaty to include Métis relatives seemed 
to be a reasonable request from the chiefs’ perspective.224 While the situation 
was defused when buffalo were spotted nearby, the intent of these chiefs was 
clear: Their insistence on the inclusion of their Métis kin in the treaty illustrates 
their understanding that Métis held rights to Treaty 6 land that were at least as 
strong as theirs.
Another notable example is the “Halfbreed Adhesion” to Treaty 3.225 In 
1875, the “Halfbreeds”—in other words, the Métis—in the territory around 
Rainy Lake and Rainy River, in what is now northwestern Ontario, signed an 
Adhesion to Treaty 3. According to the Adhesion, the Métis signatories agreed 
to surrender all of their rights, title, and interest in their lands to the Queen, 
as specified in Treaty 3.226 If the Métis had been occupying the territory at Rainy 
River and Rainy Lake at the pleasure of the local First Nation, then the First 
Nation’s surrender in Treaty 3 would have been sufficient to extinguish any and 
all existing Aboriginal title. Yet, the Crown saw fit to obtain a surrender from the 
Métis as well. From the Crown’s perspective, then, First Nation occupation of 
221. Michel Hogue, “Disputing the Medicine Line: The Plains Crees and the Canadian-American 
Border, 1876-1885” (2002) 52 Montana: The Magazine of Western History 2 at 10-11.
222. Ibid.
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the land at Rainy River and Rainy Lake did not preclude the possibility of Métis 
having equivalent rights in the same tract of land. Nor did the Métis view their 
land rights as being subordinate to those of First Nations. According to Riel, 
when Canadian authorities arrived in the Red River in 1870, they identified the 
Métis as “the people who owned the Northwest Territories. The Indian blood in 
their veins established their right to the land. They held possession of this land 
jointly with the Indians.”227
Even though the concept of joint title seems especially well suited to the 
Métis context, the trial judge in Manitoba Metis Federation held that the Métis of 
the Red River did not hold joint title with the First Nations of that territory.228 
Justice MacInnes based his conclusion on the lack of evidence of Métis objection 
to the land surrender treaties executed by First Nations in the area. He noted that 
in 1817, Lord Selkirk entered into a treaty with First Nations that purported 
to extinguish their Indian title in the Red River area known as the settlement 
belt, and that the Crown later entered into Treaties 1 and 2, which purported to 
extinguish the Indian title of the First Nations signatories to the land beyond the 
settlement belt.229 Justice MacInnes then concluded, “There is no evidence of any 
objection by the Métis on either occasion suggesting that they, not the Indians, 
held Aboriginal title over that land.”230
The trial judge’s reasoning is a non sequitur. Identifying the exact lapses in 
logic is especially important because the Supreme Court of Canada adopted his 
reasoning.231 First, why should the Métis object to First Nations’ surrender of 
their own title?232 Nothing in the Selkirk treaty233 or in Treaties 1 and 2 purports 
to extinguish the title of the Métis.234 Second, Treaties 1 and 2 were executed 
227. Riel, supra note 1 at 200.
228. MMF Trial Decision, supra note 46 at para 588.
229. Ibid at para 586.
230. Ibid at para 587.
231. Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 13 at para 56.
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Understanding of Treaty One (Saskatoon: Purish Publishing Ltd, 2013) (for an account of the 
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in 1871—one year after the Métis of the Red River ratified section 31 of the 
Manitoba Act, 1870, which purported to extinguish the title held by the Métis 
in exchange for 1.4 million acres of land. The Métis had no reason to object to 
Treaties 1 and 2, as they had already dealt with their own interest in the land a 
year earlier. The trial judge’s failure to recognize this point is especially baffling, 
given that the primary issue at trial and the main topic of his 1217 paragraph 
decision was the significance of section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870.
III. IN DEFENCE OF MÉTIS TITLE: REJECTING THE 
IMMOBILITY CRITIQUE
This brings us to the second argument against Métis title. While some critics seek 
to undermine Métis title on the basis of the mobility of the Métis, others do so on 
the basis of their supposed immobility. Borrows identifies a similar contradiction 
applied to Indigenous peoples generally:
While Indigenous peoples are told we cannot have rights if we move too much, 
we are also informed we cannot possess rights because our societies move too little. 
Caught in these cross-currents, Indigenous peoples face contradictory doctrines that 
deny legal rights for reasons directly opposed to one another.235
The immobility that concerns Borrows is the courts’ view that Indigenous 
cultures are too settled, and therefore unable to develop over time. As a result, 
practices that developed subsequent to European contact are not protected as 
Aboriginal rights.236 In contrast, we are concerned in this article with the supposed 
physical immobility of the Métis. The notion that the Métis were too immobile 
to establish Aboriginal title rests on a depiction of the Métis as unconnected 
individuals holding discrete lots along river ways in a manner similar to private 
ownership under the common law.237
This characterization emerges in the Supreme Court’s decision in Manitoba 
Metis Federation.238 The majority rejected the argument that the Crown owed 
a fiduciary duty to the Métis on the ground that the Métis in the Red River 
settlement had no Aboriginal interest in the land that could trigger a fiduciary 
235. Borrows, Freedom, supra note 6 at 31.
236. Ibid at 31-32.
237. See Flanagan, “The Case against Métis Aboriginal Rights”, supra note 36 at 318.
238. Various commentators have provided thoughtful case comments on Manitoba 
Métis Federation. See O’Toole, “Case Commentary”, supra note 46 at 184; Sacha R 
Paul, “A Comment on Manitoba Métis Federation Inc v Canada”, Case Comment, 
(2013-2014) 37 Man LJ 323.
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duty.239 According to the majority, the type of interest in land needed to trigger 
a fiduciary duty is a collective or communal one.240 The Métis in the Red River 
settlement, in contrast, held discrete lots along the rivers.241 The majority 
emphasized two features of Métis landholding in the Red River valley: First, the 
Métis held their lots individually rather than communally, and second, the Métis 
permitted alienation of their lots.242 Although the parties directed their arguments 
towards the issue of fiduciary duty, the majority also concluded that the lack of 
any communal Aboriginal interest in land meant that the Métis in the Red River 
did not have Aboriginal title to that land.243 Thus, the Métis could not establish 
Aboriginal title because of their practice of parceling land into individual lots, 
which they occupied with some permanence by building upon and farming each 
lot.244 In other words, the Métis were too immobile to establish Aboriginal title.
If the Red River Métis cannot establish Aboriginal title, then it may seem that 
all hope is lost for any other Métis community in Canada, given that the intensity 
of occupation in the Red River valley presumably could not have been exceeded 
by any other community, Métis or otherwise.245 However, several scholars have 
already deftly critiqued the majority’s rejection of Aboriginal title in Manitoba 
Metis Federation.246 Some, for example, have questioned whether the rejection 
of Aboriginal title was beyond the court’s remit, given that the Métis plaintiffs 
did not assert a claim for common law Aboriginal title247 and hence did not 
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present any evidence at trial about Métis use and occupation of land.248 Instead, 
the Métis relied on the explicit terms of section 31 of the Manitoba Act, 1870, 
which state that the grant of land to the Métis in that provision was directed 
“towards the extinguishment of the Indian Title to the lands in the Province.”249 
On the surface, these words appear to be a clear admission by the Crown that the 
Métis of the Red River held an interest in their land (which was labeled “Indian 
title”), and that that interest was being extinguished by section 31.250 Rather than 
consider this submission, a majority of the Court set up and defeated a straw 
man argument. It considered and rejected the claim, advanced by no one, that 
legislation such as section 31 could establish Aboriginal title.251
The remainder of this section builds upon this chorus of critique. It argues 
that the Court’s conclusion that Métis in the Red River did not have Aboriginal 
title because they held land individually suffers from at least two additional 
flaws. The first is that this is simply not the test for Aboriginal title. The second 
is that even if this were the test for Aboriginal title, the test would embody a 
vicious circle.
A. THIS IS NOT THE TEST FOR ABORIGINAL TITLE
As discussed in section 3 above, to prove Aboriginal title, an Aboriginal nation 
must show that its occupation of the land was sufficient and exclusive on the 
relevant assessment date, and in certain circumstances, continuous to the present 
day. This test makes no mention whatsoever of also having to engage in a pattern of 
communal landholding. If such a requirement were part of the test for Aboriginal 
title, then the Court would have said so in Tsilhqot’in, which was released a year 
after Manitoba Metis Federation. In Tsilhqot’in, the Court exhaustively detailed 
the legal principles pertaining to Aboriginal title but did not state that Aboriginal 
title presupposes communal landholding. Nor did it make any such statement 
in Delgamuukw or Marshall & Bernard.252 Granted, the Court’s jurisprudence, 
248. See Teillet, supra note 5 at 3-10; MMF Trial Decision, supra note 46 at para 9.
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Métis Federation”, supra note 238 at 335 (assuming that communal land ownership is a 
requirement of Aboriginal title and critiquing the majority in Manitoba Metis Federation 
for failing to employ the flexibility shown in Powley, where the Supreme Court of Canada 
modified the timeframe for establishing a Métis Aboriginal right “from the point of contact 
to the point of effective European control in order to recognize the fact that the Métis did 
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including Tsilhqot’in defines Aboriginal title as a collective interest in land.253 
It is important to understand, however, that this refers to the content of Aboriginal 
title, not the test for establishing Aboriginal title.254 What successful Aboriginal 
title claimants receive is a collective interest, but proving that they historically 
engaged in a pattern of communal landholding forms no part of the test they 
must meet in order to secure that collective interest.
The absence of any requirement to prove communal landholding in the 
test for Aboriginal title is no accident. To understand why, it is necessary to 
distinguish between rights and jurisdiction. Aboriginal rights jurisprudence and 
scholarship are replete with references to Aboriginal rights because section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and affirms the existing “rights” of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada.255 Similarly, the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples protects Indigenous “rights.”256 But the term “rights” 
in this context is a misnomer—Aboriginal peoples are peoples, and peoples or 
nations exercise jurisdiction. Individuals, on the other hand, possess rights.257 
When the claims of Indigenous peoples are articulated in terms of a western, 
liberal framework, they are closer to claims to exercise jurisdiction than claims to 
possess rights.258 The focus on the language of “rights” has led to the conundrum of 
how to provide a theoretical foundation for the existence of “collective rights.”259 
This conundrum disappears when Indigenous peoples are understood as seeking 
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something akin to jurisdiction, not rights. Although the concept of Aboriginal 
title includes elements of a property right,260 it is sui generis, and as such also 
includes elements of jurisdiction.261 For example, the majority in Delgamuukw 
explains that Aboriginal title land is “held by all members of an Aboriginal 
nation. Decisions with respect to that land are also made by that community. 
This is another feature of Aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes 
it from normal property interests.”262 Similarly, the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in 
explains that Aboriginal title cannot “be described with reference to traditional 
property law concepts,”263 and that the content of Aboriginal title includes “all the 
pre-sovereignty incidents of use and enjoyment that were part of the collective 
title enjoyed by the ancestors of the claimant group.”264 Thus, if prior to Crown 
sovereignty an Aboriginal nation exercised jurisdiction by implementing its laws 
throughout its territory, then exercising jurisdiction would be an incident of its 
Aboriginal title.265
This framing of the issue is consistent with the distinction between the 
internal and external aspects of Aboriginal title, as articulated by Slattery266 and 
developed by McNeil.267 The external aspects of Aboriginal title, such as the rules 
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261. See Kent McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 108 at 760; PG McHugh, “A 
Common Law Biography of Section 35” in Patrick Macklem & Douglas Sanderson, eds, 
From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal and 
Treaty Rights (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016) 137 at 145-46, 149-51 (explaining 
how some non-Indigenous scholarship initially influenced section 35(1) jurisprudence 
to articulate Aboriginal title in terms of rights, especially property rights, instead of 
self-government, or in other words in terms of dominium instead of imperium; some jurists 
have striven to collapse this distinction, with the result that the Supreme Court of Canada 
has recently begun to move away from the property rights paradigm to adopt a more public 
law-focused approach); Val Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent” (2015) 48:3 UBC L 
Rev 873 at 878-79.
262. Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 115. See also McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”, supra 
note 208 at 865.
263. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 72.
264. Ibid at para 75.
265. But see Gordon Christie, “Who Makes Decisions Over Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 
48:3 UBC L Rev 743 (identifying the various ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Tsilhqot’in limits the ability of Aboriginal title holders to exercise governing authority, 
or in other words, jurisdiction).
266. See Brian Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” in Maria Morellato, ed, 
Aboriginal Law since Delgamuukw (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book, 2009) at 155 
[Slattery, “Metamorphosis”].
267. See Kent McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 108 at 760.
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regarding the justification of a Crown infringement, are consistent from one 
Aboriginal nation to another and are determined by the common law.268 The 
internal aspects of Aboriginal title, in contrast, are determined by the laws of each 
Aboriginal nation and thus may differ from nation to nation.269 An Aboriginal 
nation’s laws govern issues such as landholding within its territory. Landholding 
patterns may therefore differ from nation to nation.270 If Aboriginal nations are 
entitled to apply their own laws to their territory, they exercise jurisdiction. Thus, 
both section 35 and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples would have been more accurate if they had used the term “jurisdiction” 
instead of imprecise terms such as “rights” or “collective rights.”271
The confusion in Manitoba Metis Federation results from referring to the 
jurisdiction of Aboriginal peoples as a “collective right” in the land, and then 
conflating the collective right with a communal landholding pattern.272 There 
is no necessary connection between holding a collective right in land and using 
that land in a communal way. The collective right that Aboriginal title-holders 
have should be understood as a right to exercise jurisdiction. The Aboriginal 
nation may exercise its jurisdiction in whatever manner it chooses, subject to the 
limitation that the land cannot be used “in a way that would substantially deprive 
future generations of the benefit of the land,”273 and subject to any justified 
Crown infringements.274 The Aboriginal nation may exercise its jurisdiction by 
implementing laws providing for communal landholding, or by implementing 
268. See Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, supra note 266 at 155; Kent McNeil, “Site-Specific or 
Territorial?”, supra note 112 at 760.
269. See Kent McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 112 at 760. See also Mabo, supra 
note 76 at paras 68, 75 (explaining that the incidents, or internal aspects, of ‘native title’ 
are “determined by the laws and customs of the indigenous inhabitants” while the external 
aspects, such as rules pertaining to extinguishment, are based on the common law).
270. See Kent McNeil, “Site-Specific or Territorial?”, supra note 108 at 760.
271. See Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 115 (for use of the term “collective right”). See also 
the UN Declaration, supra note 255 at preamble, art 7(2), art 40. The UN Declaration 
confirms the jurisdictional nature of Indigenous rights insofar as it requires states to give 
due recognition to Indigenous peoples’ laws (article 27), to “obtain their free and informed 
consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands” (article 32(2)), and 
insofar as it protects the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain their “juridical systems or 
customs” (article 34).
272. See Manitoba Metis Federation, supra note 13 at paras 53-59 (especially para 53). See 
also Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at para 115 (equivocating between the terms ‘communal’ 
and ‘collective’, but not requiring proof of communal land-holding as part of the test for 
Aboriginal title).
273. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 74.
274. Sparrow, supra note 3 at para 71.
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laws providing for individual landholding. If it implements laws allowing for 
individual landholding, its Aboriginal title is not negated, just as the jurisdiction 
of the Crown is not negated by virtue of the fact that the common law allows for 
individual landholding.
It may be tempting to object, as the trial judge in Manitoba Metis Federation 
seemed to do, that even though the Crown can exercise its jurisdiction by 
authorizing communal landholding, individual landholding, or even some as yet 
unheard of form of landholding, this same range of options is excluded from 
Aboriginal jurisdiction by virtue of the principle of inalienability. This principle 
holds that Aboriginal title land cannot be alienated except upon surrender to the 
Crown. Freedom of alienation is often a concomitant of individual landholding, 
as it was for the Métis in the Red River. According to the trial judge, this was 
fatal to the notion that the Métis held Aboriginal title. The trial judge held that 
the principle of inalienability was a requirement of the test for Aboriginal title 
and that the Métis failed to meet this requirement because Métis and non-Métis 
individuals in the Red River area bought and sold individual plots of land.275 The 
Supreme Court of Canada apparently affirmed this conclusion.276
The problem with this line of thought is that the principle of inalienability 
is not a requirement of the test for Aboriginal title. As discussed above, the 
three requirements for establishing Aboriginal title—sufficient, exclusive, and 
in certain circumstances, continuous occupation—make no mention of the 
principle of inalienability.277 Just as the collective nature of Aboriginal title is part 
of the content of Aboriginal title, not part of the test for establishing it, so too 
is the principle of inalienability. It is not necessary for Aboriginal claimants to 
prove that they never alienated land in order to establish Aboriginal title. Rather, 
the principle that Aboriginal title is inalienable except upon surrender to the 
Crown means that any attempt by the Aboriginal nation to alienate its title to 
anyone other than the Crown will be void. The Aboriginal nation can authorize 
individual landholding as well as the alienation of individual lots, as long as the 
Aboriginal nation retains its Aboriginal title, or in other words, its jurisdiction, 
over the land. Similarly, the Crown does not lose its jurisdiction by authorizing 
the alienation of individual plots of land, even if those plots are alienated to 
citizens of other countries.
To summarize, an Aboriginal nation need not prove communal landholding 
in order to establish Aboriginal title, because communal landholding is only one 
275. MMF Trial Decision, supra note 46 at paras 591-92.
276. Ibid at para 56.
277. See Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 24-66.
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possible manifestation of Aboriginal title. It is true that the jurisdiction historically 
exercised by Aboriginal peoples can play a role in establishing Aboriginal title. 
As discussed above, when assessing Aboriginal title, the common law perspective 
must be balanced with the Aboriginal perspective, which includes the laws of 
the Aboriginal nation.278 Examples of an Aboriginal people implementing its 
own laws—or in other words, exercising jurisdiction—can serve as evidence 
of sufficient occupation over the land.279 To assume that that jurisdiction can 
only be exercised in the form of communal land holding is to succumb to false 
stereotypes about Indigenous relationships to land at the expense of actual 
historical evidence.
One need not look far into Métis history to find examples of Métis exercising 
jurisdiction in the Red River settlement and on the prairies more generally. Prior 
to the Crown’s effective control of the northwest Métis regularly governed the 
land—alongside First Nations—using their own laws and for generations were 
capable of implementing their own laws to govern both their own people and 
outsiders in the Métis homeland. One consistent feature of Métis communities 
was the long-lot river lot system, which “apportioned in narrow frontage lots that 
were worked for a considerable distance back from the river.”280 In Red River, the 
river lots ran back two miles from the river, but contained another two miles of 
“hay privilege,” an area of land that was treated as individually held property used 
for grazing animals. While the Hudson’s Bay Company considered this land to be 
beyond the two miles of land surrendered by the Selkirk Treaty in 1817,281 Métis 
like Peter Erasmus considered these lots to be settled “by common consent.”282 
While many individuals’ lots were not contained in the Company’s land registry 
(and were thus subject to re-organization by surveyors from 1869), many Métis 
like Erasmus still considered Métis as the owners of their river lots:
[T]he system became a source of grievance in that no recognition of the lines of 
occupation was considered by the government surveyors, but the land was divided 
into quarter sections. Frequently, these river lot parcels, owned by the residents for 
278. Ibid at paras 34-35, 41.
279. See Delgamuukw, supra note 9 at paras 147-48 (for passages affirming the principle that the 
laws of the Aboriginal claimant nation are relevant in establishing sufficiency of occupation); 
Tsilhqot’in, ibid at paras 35, 41. See also Borrows, “Durability”, supra note 77 at 717-20 
(discussing the role Tsilhqot’in law played in the trial judge’s finding that the Tsilhqot’in 
nation established sufficient occupation).
280. Erasmus, supra note 165 at 3.
281. See Gaudry, supra note 31.
282. Erasmus, supra note 165 at 3.
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as long as fifty years in some cases, were crossed by survey lines. The people feared 
the loss of their land…283
Even the most prominent critic of Métis title, Tom Flanagan, identifies an 
agreed upon process through which Métis could claim lands they viewed as held 
in common for their individual family:
They would mark off land by putting stakes in the ground, cutting blazes on the 
trees, or plowing a furrow around the edge. They might also erect a roofless square of 
logs as a sign of intended future occupation. A man might claim several for his sons, 
brothers, or in-laws. The land might be used for years in seasonal ways—cutting 
hay and timber, pasturing livestock, making maple sugar—without being occupied 
year-round. The final step of settling on the land, building a permanent house, and 
planting crops might not come until years after such episodic visitation.284
Occasionally, Métis would register their lots with the Company, but most 
Métis families did not. Their own customary practice extended a form of collective 
jurisdiction over their territory, which, as Riel noted, surrounded the Company’s 
forts in the settlement with Métis river lots, following Métis law with little 
regard for the Company’s rule. In the introduction to Alexander Ross’s Red River 
Settlement, W.L. Morton reminds historians that through much of the settlement’s 
history, “the plain truth was that there was no means of raising a public force that 
could impress the Métis,” and that “the peace was kept in Assiniboia by influence 
and persuasion, seldom by authority.”285 While the Company claimed to be the 
sole “civilized” authority at Red River, the reality on the ground was that Métis 
law and politics were in effective control of the settlement. Because of this, few 
Métis registered their land with the Company—which was not necessarily seen 
as the competent authority for this—and Métis only became concerned about 
283. Ibid at 3.
284. Flanagan, Métis Lands, supra note 22 at 19.
285. WL Morton, “Introduction to the New Edition” in Ross, ed, The Red River Settlement, supra 
note 166 at xxii. This, however, is not the universal view; some scholars fail to treat Métis 
as a legal entity with a legal code of its own. Dale Gibson, Law, Life and Government at Red 
River: Settlement and Governance, 1812-1872 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 
2016) at 351. Gibson argues that the Red River population showed the justice system a 
“widespread acceptance” even at times of conflict over its procedure. However, consistent 
with his previous work, Gibson generally fails to acknowledge Métis actions as collective 
actions governed by another form of law, constructing Métis rejection of the HBC fur 
trade monopoly—an important moment in Métis nationalist rememberings—as a mere 
“riot” against an established and legitimate authority. However, Métis collective action is 
self-evident at Red River, due to a surviving archive which shows Métis political and legal 
assertions, and contests with the supposedly prevailing HBC-run legal system. While the 
Company’s law certainly existed it was regularly contested and never fully accepted by Métis.
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external recognition of their river lots when the impending arrival of Canadian 
surveyors in 1869 threatened their expropriation.
As previously demonstrated, legitimate authority for Métis of this era was 
constructed by those who would be governed by it. In other words, Métis were 
resistant to Company authority and other forms of Crown authority because 
they were not a party to its creation. In instances where Company and Métis 
authority clashed, Métis almost always asserted their own jurisdiction in its place, 
and due to the political and military realities described by Morton, they did 
so successfully in most cases. In 1834, Métis obstructed the Company’s justice 
system by preventing one of their own from facing a public whipping for a 
theft conviction, a punishment Métis found unconscionable given that under 
buffalo hunt law it was reserved for habitual thieves, not first-time offenders.286 
In 1845, Métis refused to pay Hudson’s Bay Company import duties, and in 
1849, the Métis declared with great efficacy the death of the Company’s monopoly 
on the sale of fur, ushering in an era of Métis free trading and unprecedented 
economic power.287
While Métis used the buffalo hunt to ensure their independence from 
Company authority, they also at times used it to govern the behaviour of 
non-Métis. On an individual level, it has long been noted that fur traders 
adopted the protocols of Indigenous peoples to successfully trade with them.288 
On another level, Métis also brought the Company and its servants “under the 
protection of Métis laws.”289
In 1875, Saskatchewan Métis leader Gabriel Dumont’s hunting brigade 
confronted a group of three Métis “free hunters” who were hunting with a party 
of Company men. These three Métis had been contracted to provision local 
Hudson’s Bay Company trading posts with buffalo meat. They were also members 
of Dumont’s brigade and thus party to its law and under its jurisdiction. Since 
they had left the camp in the spring to lead a Company hunting party, they had 
violated Métis laws by “going before” and hunting ahead of the main party and 
thus risking the dispersal of the buffalo before Métis families could hunt for 
themselves. Due to this violation of Métis law, Dumont and his hunters informed 
the Company party that they were forbidden to hunt. However, the Métis also 
286. JM Bumsted, Trials and Tribulations: The Red River Settlement and the Emergence of Manitoba, 
1811-1870 (Winnipeg: Great Plains Publications, 2003) at 72.
287. Ibid at 99.
288. Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North 
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2012) at 15-16.
289. Riel, supra note 1 at 204.
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offered them a place in the Métis brigade under Métis leadership, law, and 
jurisdiction, which would result in a share of the camp’s meat as well. Only under 
the control of the Métis camp would these men be allowed access to the buffalo. 
When the Company party refused this offer, the three Métis were subjected to 
fines for violating their laws and the Company party was dismissed to complain 
to Canadian authorities. Before 1870, little could have been done, but by 1875 
Canada had a military presence in the region, so Dumont’s assertion of Métis 
jurisdiction in this matter caused the dispatch of the Northwest Mounted Police 
to Batoche. Interestingly, the Northwest Mounted Police seemed more concerned 
about preventing another Red River Resistance than they were with disrupting 
Métis customary hunting laws. Reports of this incident eventually made their way 
to London, where the Imperial Secretary for the Colonies expressed sympathy for 
the Métis, noting, it “would be difficult to take strong exception to the acts of a 
community which appears to have honestly endeavoured to maintain order by 
the best means in its power.”290 Through such means, Métis continued to practice 
independent self-governance and assert collective jurisdiction over their territory. 
This is demonstrative not only of an enduring collective interest in the land but 
an ongoing Aboriginal exercise of jurisdiction.
While departing in some ways from the European norms of the day, Métis 
occupation of land nonetheless made sense to Métis who understood these 
rules and agreed to be governed by them. Métis were also successful at exerting 
influence, control, and even governance over outsiders who, despite their 
pretensions to the contrary, were not in firm control of the places they claimed as 
theirs by sovereign right.
B. A VICIOUS CIRCLE DOES NOT PROMOTE RECONCILIATION
The second problem with the conclusion that the Métis in the Red River did 
not have Aboriginal title because they held land individually is that it results in 
a vicious circle. On the one hand, we learned from Delgamuukw, Marshall & 
Bernard, and Tsilhqot’in that to establish Aboriginal title, the Aboriginal nation 
must show that it occupied land in a way that is comparable to what is required 
to establish title at common law.291 Granted, the Court discusses balancing the 
common law perspective with the Aboriginal perspective.292 But the role of 
the Aboriginal perspective in this balancing exercise is subsidiary to that of the 
common law insofar as Aboriginal practices and customs are not the ultimate 
290. Woodcock, supra note 156 at 103, 110.
291. Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at para 54; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 42.
292. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 34; Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at paras 45, 46.
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determinants of sufficient occupation. The common law standard—specifically, 
that of a general occupant—is still the standard that must be met.293 The role of 
the Aboriginal perspective is merely to ensure that when Aboriginal practices and 
customs are compared to the common law standard, the comparison is carried 
out in a culturally sensitive way.294 Tsilhqot’in affirms the overriding principle 
articulated in Marshall & Bernard295 that the common law standard governs 
the Aboriginal title analysis.296 Thus, when Aboriginal nations fail to establish 
Aboriginal title, as they did in Marshall & Bernard, it is because their manner 
of occupying the land was too nomadic to meet the common law standard 
for occupation.297
On the other hand, the implication of the Manitoba Metis Federation 
decision is that if the occupation exhibited by the Aboriginal nation is too close 
to the common law standard, then the Aboriginal title claim fails. The Métis of 
the Red River fulfilled and likely exceeded the standard of a general occupant 
insofar as they demarcated individual lots, farmed those lots, and built permanent 
dwellings on them.298 We must comply with the common law to win, but if we 
comply with the common law, we lose. This cannot be the test that Métis have to 
meet in order to establish Aboriginal title because if it is, it is Kafkaesque.
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the goal of section 35 is to promote 
reconciliation between Aboriginal nations and the non-Aboriginal citizens of this 
country.299 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission recently released its final 
report, with ninety-four calls to action designed to promote reconciliation.300 
Reconciliation should rank high on this nation’s agenda. But a test that is 
impossible to meet because it embodies a Kafkaesque vicious circle will do 
nothing to promote reconciliation.
293. Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at paras 39, 42.
294. Marshall & Bernard, supra note 54 at para 48; Tsilhqot’in, supra note 4 at para 50.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the foregoing analysis illustrating the strength of potential Métis title 
claims, Canada’s response to this issue has been exceedingly slow. The federal 
government has been addressing unresolved Aboriginal title claims by negotiating 
modern treaties pursuant to its Comprehensive Land Claims Policy since 1973,301 
and yet as Douglas Eyford notes, this policy does not address the rights of Métis 
people.302 In his report on the reform of the Comprehensive Land Claims Policy, 
Eyford exhorts Canada to “do more in its relationship with the Métis to ensure 
their section 35 rights are appropriately recognized and can be meaningfully 
exercised.”303 He also recommends that Canada “develop a reconciliation 
process to support the exercise of Métis section 35(1) rights and to reconcile 
their interests.”304 Similarly, in August 2015, the Métis Nation of Ontario passed 
a unanimous resolution calling on the federal government to establish a land 
claims process addressing outstanding Métis land claims.305
In response to Métis calls for action and to Eyford’s report, Canada recently 
appointed Thomas Isaac as the Ministerial Special Representative to Lead 
Engagement with Métis.306 Isaac heard from Métis communities from early June 
2015 to mid-January 2016, and on 21 July 2016, released a report containing 
seventeen recommendations for a new framework to address section 35 Métis 
rights.307 Isaac found that “[o]utside of litigation, Métis presently have no 
301. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Renewing the Federal Comprehensive Land 
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303. Ibid at 44.
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formal means to bring claims relating to section 35 rights before Canada for 
consideration.”308 Accordingly, he recommends that “Canada either amend its 
existing Comprehensive Land Claims and Specific Claims Policies, or develop 
a new policy, that expressly addresses Métis section 35 rights claims and related 
issues.”309 Isaac includes Métis land claims among the types of claims this new or 
amended policy should address.310 Given the arguments presented here outlining 
the strengths of potential Métis title claims, Canada would do well to implement 
these recommendations forthwith.
308. Isaac, Métis Rights Report, ibid at 30.
309. Ibid at 30, 44.
310. Isaac, Métis Rights Report, ibid at 30 (listing “the Métis land claim in North-West 
Saskatchewan” as an example of the unresolved Métis claims that should be addressed by 
Canada and also the provinces”).
